

Component-based Software Engineering

References:

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2. E. Weyuker, "Testing Component-based Software: A Cautionary Tale", IEEE Software Sept/Oct 1998
3. J. Voas, "Maintaining Component-based Systems", IEEE Software July/Aug 1998
4. J. Voas, "Certifying Off-the-shelf SW Components", IEEE Computer, June 1998, Vol 31, No 6
5. N. Talbert, "The Cost of COTS", an interview with John McDermid in IEEE Computer, June 1998, Vol 31, No 6

Motivations for Components

- **Development time:** architectural, design, source code artifacts
- **Build time:** reusing partial design and implementation fragments
- **Deployment time:** allows last customization before installation
 - Deployment - act of readying a component for installation in a specific environment
- **Evolution:** dynamic servicing, upgrading, extension, integration into already deployed

What's a SW component?

- **A unit of deployment**
 - An executable deliverable for a (virtual) machine; executes w/o human intervention
- **A unit of versioning and replacement**
 - Remains invariant (code and data) as is installed
- **May have static dependences, assumptions about environment**
 - On platform
 - On other components

Complications

- Naming w/o collisions
- Versioning
 - Need version in the name
 - Side-by-side existence of diff versions of same component sometimes needed
 - Interferes with cross-component integration
 - Varies with degree of coupling

Testing

- **Need for testing a component in its new context**
 - Ariane 5 disaster
- **Reuse of COTS, commercial off-the-shelf components, requires new approaches to testing to avoid this**
 - **Testing techniques cannot require source code**
 - Not available in legacy codes nor off-the shelf comps

Phases of Testing

- **Unit test** - individual components
- **Integration test** - integrating individually tested components to test as an entity
- **System test** - entire system tested as one entity
- **Additional** - performance test, stress test, reliability tests

Testing Component-based SW

- Difficult to construct test suites
- Testing for reuse
 - Possibility of executing different parts of the component may lead into untested or lightly tested code
 - Even COTS components need retesting in situ
 - Debugging much more difficult w/o developer knowledge
 - W/o source code how to correct defects found?

Components

- **In-house**
 - Test various uses for component
 - Cannot envision all scenarios
 - Debugging and code modification difficult
 - Validation of quality difficult
 - Rethink repository design to include specs, modifc, test suite with ptrs to corresponding parts of code

- **COTS**
 - Lack of source code precludes modification for debugging or extension
 - Lack of detailed knowledge of design
 - No control over maintenance or support

Maintenance

- Longest stage in SW life cycle
- Components to be maintained are essentially black boxes
- Claim that OOPLs and componentn-based SE, turn SW development into SW manufacturing
 - Principle task: design & integration, not coding

Problems Maintaining COTS

- **Frozen functionality - no further vendor support**
 - Implement yourself; obtain code and modify; get elsewhere
- **Incompatible upgrades - customization**
 - Build wrapper around incompat behavior or uninstall component
- **Trojan horses - covertly malicious component**
 - Avoidance may be impossible; detection is difficult

Problems Maintaining COTS

- **Unreliable components - no standards for reliability certification**
- **Wrappers - middleware that limits a components functionality**
 - **Middleware: SW that joins together, mediates between, or enhances 2 separate SW packages**
 - **Restricts input or output info**
 - **Reasonable approach to incompatibility, Trojan horses, dependability problems**
 - **Not foolproof**

Shareware/Freeware

- Often useful, but can be used for malicious purposes
- Licensing restrictions can exist
- If SW in executable format, then like COTS
- If SW is source code, then may need domain knowledge for maintenance

Proprietary Repositories

- **Functional structure**
 - All source together, all analysis together, all designs together, all tests together
- **Information class structure**
 - Each component has source, analysis, design, tests stored together (easier to maintain)

Challenges

- **Problem: ensuring that modifications are compatible with all clients**
 - **Control change process**
 - Can add access rules about modification, but file locking creates problems for maintaining the applications using components
 - If do not lock, then change merging becomes a problem
 - **Use promotion approach - levels of confidence in SW stability, managed by a person**
 - Development/maintenance (low), test, release (high)

Voas' Advice

- **Avoid using components for small systems**
- **Keep reqs documentation on each component; do not add too many features**
- **Use information class repository with promotion**
- **Allow 2 versions of component to be in repository when necessary for needs of 2 clients**

Cf 4. Voas

Certifying Components

- **Use of off-the-shelf (OTS) components require developer to know**
 - Is component reliable?
 - Will system tolerate the component?
- **Key questions:**
 - Does component C fit the need?
 - Is the quality of component C high enough?
 - What impact will component C have on the system?
- **Composing highly reliable components may not yield a reliable system!**

Scenarios

Fit the need?

High quality?

Positive impact?

| | | | |
|----------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1 | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 2 | Yes | Yes | No |
| 3 | Yes | No | Yes |
| 4 | Yes | No | No |
| 5 | No | N/A | N/A |

How to certify a component?

- **Black-box component testing to ascertain if quality is high enough**
 - Cannot use white-box approach w/o code
 - Use test suite distributed with component
 - **Problems**
 - Need an accurate oracle
 - May not execute enough of the code (e.g., possible malicious functionality -- Trojan horse)

How to certify a component?

- **System-level fault injection to see if system can tolerate component failure**
 - **IPA - Interface Propagation Analysis - perturbs the state propagated through component interface**
 - Can simulate failure of predecessor component
 - Modify data randomly

How to certify a component?

- **Operational system testing to see if system works well with component**
 - Embed the component in the system and can see component failure in place
 - Problem - can take extensive testing to see failure happen
 - Solution - wrap component to limit its actions and modify its functionality
 - Can keep inputs from reaching component
 - Can keep outputs from reaching component clients

Cf 5. Talbert

COTS vs Custom Alternatives

- **John McDermid, safety critical systems expert, Univ of York, UK**
 - **COTS- “standard commercial software developed w/o any particular application in mind”**
 - **Why use? To save money and allow interoperability and lessen risk**
 - **Mostly are providing GUIs, O/S, DBs**

How to evaluate COTS SW?

- **Stability of COTS SW and prior usage**
- **Need to learn what COTS SW does**
 - Extensive testing
- **Determine which fcns are safe for client use**
- **Examine reliability**
 - Gather historical data (look at/analyze code if can get it)
- **Demonstrate some certainty that SW cannot execute unwanted functionality**
 - Use wrappers or code analysis or both

Cost of COTS SW

- **Initial acquisition cost**
- **Keeping up with upgrades**
- **Problem:**
 - **What if vendor goes out of business?**
 - **SW escrow accounts - 3rd party keeps copy of SW to be turned over in event of disaster**
 - **What to do about bad support?**
 - **How to ensure safety of code?**
 - **Need to look at/analyze code which may be difficult**
 - **May need to deal with unwanted functionality**