

Effect of Intrusion Detection and Response on Reliability of Cyber Physical Systems

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Abstract—In this paper we analyze the effect of intrusion detection and response on the reliability of a cyber physical system (CPS) comprising sensors, actuators, control units, and physical objects for controlling and protecting a physical infrastructure. We develop a probability model based on Stochastic Petri nets to describe the behavior of the CPS in the presence of both malicious nodes exhibiting a range of attacker behaviors, and an intrusion detection and response system (IDRS) for detecting and responding to malicious events at runtime. Our results indicate that adjusting detection and response strength in response to attacker strength and behavior detected can significantly improve the reliability of the CPS. We report numerical data for a CPS subject to persistent, random and insidious attacks with physical interpretations given.

keywords: Reliability, intrusion detection, intrusion response, cyber physical systems, performance analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION

A cyber physical system (CPS) typically comprises sensors, actuators, control units, and physical objects for controlling and protecting a physical infrastructure. Because of the dire consequence of a CPS failure, protecting a CPS from malicious attacks is of paramount importance. In this paper we address the reliability issue of a CPS designed to sustain malicious attacks over a prolonged mission period without energy replenishment. A CPS often operates in a rough environment wherein energy replenishment is not possible and nodes may be compromised (or captured) at times. Thus, an intrusion detection and response system (IDRS) must detect malicious nodes without unnecessarily wasting energy to prolong the system lifetime.

Intrusion detection system (IDS) design for CPSs has attracted considerable attention [1], [6]. Detection techniques in general can be classified into three types: signature based, anomaly based, and specification based techniques. In the area of signature based IDS techniques, Oman and Phillips [15] study an IDS for CPSs that tests an automated XML profile to Snort signature transform in an electricity distribution laboratory. Verba and Milvich [19] study an IDS for CPSs that takes a multitrust hybrid approach using signature based detection and traffic analysis. Our work is different from these studies in that we use specification based detection rather than signature based detection to deal with unknown attacker patterns.

In the area of anomaly based IDS techniques, Barbosa and Pras [2] study an IDS for CPSs that tests state machine and Markov chain approaches to traffic analysis on a water distribution system based on a comprehensive vulnerability assessment. Linda, et al. [12] study an IDS for CPSs that uses error-back propagation and Levenberg-Marquardt approaches with window based feature extraction. Gao, et al. [10] study an IDS for CPSs that uses a three stage back propagation artificial neural network (ANN) based on Modbus features. Belletini and Rrushi [3] study an IDS for CPSs that seeds the runtime stack with NULL calls, applies shuffle operations and performs detection using product machines. Yang, et al. [20] study an IDS for CPSs that uses SNMP to drive prediction, residual calculation and detection modules for an experimental testbed. Bigham, et al. [4] study an IDS for CPSs that demonstrates promising control of detection and false negative rates. Tsang and Kwong [18] study a rich multitrust IDS for CPSs that uses a novel machine learning approach. Xie, et al. [13] surveys IDS for CPSs that advocates an anomaly based layered approach. Our work is different from these studies in that we use specification based rather than anomaly based techniques to avoid using resource-constrained sensors or actuators in a CPS for profiling anomaly patterns (e.g., through learning) and to avoid high false positives (treating good nodes as bad nodes).

In the area of specification-based IDS techniques, Cheung, et al. [7] study a specification based IDS that uses PVS to transform protocol, communication pattern and service availability specifications into a format compatible with EMERALD. Carcano, et al. [5] propose a specification based IDS that extends [9] and distinguishes faults and attacks, describes a language to express a CPS specification, and establishes a critical state distance metric. Zimmer, et al. [21] study a specification based IDS that instruments a target application and uses a scheduler to confirm timing analysis results. Our work is also specification based. However, our work is different from these prior studies in that we automatically map a specification into a state machine consisting of good and bad states and simply measure a node's deviation from good states at runtime for intrusion detection. Moreover we apply specification-based techniques to host-level intrusion detection only. To cope with incomplete and uncertain information available to nodes in the CPS and to

mitigate the effect of node collusion, we devise system-level intrusion detection based on multitrust to yield a low false alarm probability.

While the literature is abundant in the collection and analysis aspects of intrusion detection, the response aspect is little treated. In particular, there is a gap with respect to intrusion detection and response. Our IDRS design addresses both intrusion detection and response issues, with the goal to maximize the CPS lifetime.

Our methodology for CPS reliability assessment is model-based analysis. Specifically, we develop a probability model to assess the reliability property of a CPS equipped with an intrusion detection and response system (IDRS) for detecting and responding to malicious events detected. Untreated in the literature, we consider a variety of attacker behaviors including persistent, random and insidious attacker models and identify the best design settings of the detection strength and response strength to best balance energy conservation vs. intrusion tolerance for achieving high reliability, when given a set of parameter values characterizing the operational environment and network conditions.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II gives the system model. Section III develops a mathematical model based on Stochastic Petri Nets [16] for theoretical analysis. Section IV discusses the parameterization process for the reference CPS. Section V presents numerical data with physical interpretations given. Finally, Section VI summarizes the paper and outlines some future research areas.

II. SYSTEM MODEL/REFERENCE CONFIGURATION

A. Reference CPS

Our reference CPS model is based on the CPS infrastructure described in [14] comprising at the sensor layer 128 sensor-carried mobile nodes. Each node ranges its neighbors periodically. Each node uses its sensor to measure any detectable phenomena nearby. Each node transmits a CDMA waveform. Neighbors receiving that waveform transform the timing of the PN code (1023 symbols) and RF carrier (915 MHz) into distance. Essentially each node performs sensing and reporting functions to provide information to upper layer control devices to control and protect the CPS infrastructure, and in addition utilizes its ranging function for node localization and intrusion detection.

The reference model is a special case of a single-enclave system with homogeneous nodes. The IDS functionality is distributed to all nodes in the system for intrusion/fault tolerance. On top of the sensor-carried mobile nodes sits an enclave control node responsible for setting system parameters in response to dynamically changing conditions such as changes of attacker strength. The control module is assumed fault/intrusion free through security/hardware protection mechanisms against capture attacks/hardware failure.

B. Security Failure

While our approach is general enough to take any security failure definition, we consider two security failure conditions.

The first condition is based on the Byzantine fault model [11]. That is, if one-third or more of the nodes are compromised, then the system fails. The reason is that once the system contains 1/3 or more compromised nodes, it is impossible to reach a consensus, hence inducing a security failure. The second condition is impairment failure. This is, heavy impairment due to attacks will result in a security failure when the system is not able to respond to attacks in a timely manner. This is modeled by defining an impairment-failure period beyond which the system cannot sustain the damage.

C. Attack Model

The first step in investigating network security is to define the attack model. We consider capture attacks which turn a good node into a bad insider node. At the sensor/actuator layer of the CPS architecture, a bad node can perform data spoofing attacks (reporting spoof sensor data) and bad command execution attacks. At the networking layer, a bad node can perform various communication attacks including selective forwarding, packet dropping, packet spoofing, packet replaying, packet flooding and even Sybil attacks to disrupt the system's packet routing functionality. At the control layer, a bad node can perform control-level attacks including aggregated data spoofing attacks, and command spoofing attacks. Nodes at the control layer, however, are less susceptible to capture attacks because they are normally deployed in a physical confine which protects them from tampering. For this reason in this paper our primary interest is on capture attacks of sensor/actuator nodes performing basic sensing, actuating and networking functions.

We consider three attacker models: persistent, random, and insidious. A persistent attacker performs attacks with probability one (i.e., whenever it has a chance). The primary objective is to cause impairment failure. A random attacker performs attacks randomly with probability p_{random} . The primary objective is to evade detection. It may take a longer time for a random attacker to cause impairment failure since the attack is random. However random attackers are hidden so it may increase the probability of Byzantine security failure once the number of bad nodes equals or exceeds 1/3 of the node population. An insidious attacker is hidden all the time to evade detection until a critical mass of compromised nodes is reached to perform "all in" attacks. The primary objective is to maximize the failure probability caused by either impairment or Byzantine security failure.

D. Host Intrusion Detection

Our host intrusion detection protocol design is based on two core techniques: behavior rule specification and vector similarity specification. The basic idea of behavior rule specification is to specify the behavior of an entity (a sensor or an actuator) by a set of rules from which a state machine is automatically derived. Then, node misbehavior can be assessed by observing the behaviors of the node against the state machine (or behavior rules). The basic idea of vector similarity specification is to compare similarity of

a sequence of sensor readings, commands or votes among entities performing the same set of functions. A state machine is also automatically derived from which a similarity test is performed to detect outliers. More specifically, the states derived in the state machine would be labeled as secure vs. insecure. A monitoring node then applies snooping and overhearing techniques observing the percentage of time a neighbor node is in secure states over a detection interval, say, T_{IDS} . A longer sojourn time in secure states indicates greater specification compliance while a shorter sojourn time indicates less specification compliance. If the compliance degree of node i denoted by X_i falls below a minimum compliance threshold denoted by C_T , node i is considered compromised. We apply these two host IDS techniques to the reference CPS as follows: (a) a monitoring node periodically determines a sequence of locations of a sensor-carried mobile node within radio range through ranging and detects if the location sequence (corresponding to the state sequence) deviates from the expected location sequence; (b) a monitoring node periodically collects votes from neighbor nodes who have participated in system intrusion detection (described below) and detects dissimilarity of vote sequences among these neighbors for outlier detection.

The measurement of compliance degree of a node frequently is not perfect and can be affected by noise and unreliable wireless communication in the CPS. We model the compliance degree by a random variable X with $G(\cdot) = Beta(\alpha, \beta)$ distribution [17], with the value 0 indicating that the output is totally unacceptable (zero compliance) and 1 indicating the output is totally acceptable (perfect compliance), such that $G(a)$, $0 \leq a \leq 1$, is given by

$$G(a) = \int_0^a \frac{\Gamma(\alpha + \beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)} x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1} dx \quad (1)$$

and the expected value of X is given by

$$E_B[X] = \int_0^1 x \frac{\Gamma(\alpha + \beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)} x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1} dx = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} \quad (2)$$

The α and β parameters are to be estimated based on the method of maximum likelihood by using the compliance degree history collected during the system's testing phase in which the system is tested with its anticipated attacker event profile and where the compliance degree is assessed using the specification-based host IDS technique described earlier. The compliance degree history collected this way is the realization of a sequence of random variables (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n) where c_i is the i^{th} compliance degree output observed during the testing phase, and n is the total number of compliance degree outputs observed. The maximum likelihood estimates of α and β are obtained by numerically solving the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{n \frac{\partial \Gamma(\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta})}{\partial \hat{\alpha}}}{\Gamma(\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta})} - \frac{n \frac{\partial \Gamma(\hat{\alpha})}{\partial \hat{\alpha}}}{\Gamma(\hat{\alpha})} + \sum_{i=1}^n \log c_i &= 0 \\ \frac{n \frac{\partial \Gamma(\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta})}{\partial \hat{\beta}}}{\Gamma(\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta})} - \frac{n \frac{\partial \Gamma(\hat{\beta})}{\partial \hat{\beta}}}{\Gamma(\hat{\beta})} + \sum_{i=1}^n \log(1 - c_i) &= 0 \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where

$$\frac{\partial \Gamma(\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta})}{\partial \hat{\alpha}} = \int_0^\infty (\log x) x^{\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta} - 1} e^{-x} dx.$$

A less general, though simpler model, is to consider a single parameter $Beta(\beta)$ distribution with α equal to 1. In this case, the density is $\beta(1-x)^{\beta-1}$ for $0 \leq x \leq 1$ and 0 otherwise. The maximum likelihood estimate of β is

$$\hat{\beta} = \frac{n}{\sum_{i=1}^n \log\left(\frac{1}{1-c_i}\right)} \quad (4)$$

Host intrusion detection is characterized by per-node false negative and false positive probabilities, denoted by p_{fn} and p_{fp} , respectively. While many detection criteria are possible, we consider a threshold criterion in this paper. That is, if a bad node's compliance degree denoted by X_b is higher than a system minimum compliance threshold C_T then there is a false negative. Suppose that the compliance degree X_b of a bad node is modeled by a $G(\cdot) = Beta(\alpha, \beta)$ distribution as described above. Then the host IDS false negative probability p_{fn} is given by:

$$p_{fn} = \Pr\{X_b > C_T\} = 1 - G(C_T). \quad (5)$$

On the other hand, if a good node's compliance degree denoted by X_g is less than C_T then there is a false positive. Again suppose that the compliance degree X_g of a good node is modeled by a $G(\cdot) = Beta(\alpha, \beta)$ distribution. Then the host false positive probability p_{fp} is given by:

$$p_{fp} = \Pr\{X_g \leq C_T\} = G(C_T). \quad (6)$$

Here we observe that these two probabilities are largely affected by the setting of the minimum compliance threshold C_T . A large C_T induces a small false negative probability at the expense of a large false positive probability. Conversely, a small C_T induces a small false positive probability at the expense of a large false negative probability. A proper setting of C_T in response to attacker strength detected at runtime helps maximize the system lifetime.

E. System Intrusion Detection

Our system IDS technique is based on majority voting of host IDS results to cope with incomplete and uncertain information available to nodes in the CPS. Our system-level IDS technique involves the selection of m detectors as well as the invocation interval T_{IDS} to best balance energy conservation vs. intrusion tolerance for achieving high reliability. Each node periodically exchanges its routing information, location, and identifier with its neighbor nodes. A coordinator is selected randomly among neighbors so that the adversaries will not have specific targets. We add randomness to the coordinator selection process by introducing a hashing function that takes in the identifier of a node concatenated with the current location of the node as the hash key. The node with the smallest returned hash value would then become the coordinator. Because candidate nodes know

each other's identifier and location, they can independently execute the hash function to determine which node would be the coordinator. The coordinator then selects m detectors randomly (including itself), and lets all detectors know each others' identities so that each voter can send its yes/no vote to other detectors. Vote authenticity is achieved via preloaded public keys. At the end of the voting process, all detectors will know the same result, that is, the node is diagnosed as good, or as bad based on the majority vote.

The system IDS is characterized by system false negative and false positive probabilities, denoted by \mathcal{P}_{fn} and \mathcal{P}_{fp} , respectively. These two false alarm probabilities are not constant but vary dynamically, depending on the percentage of bad nodes in the system when majority voting is performed. We will derive these two probabilities in the paper.

F. Intrusion Response

Our IDRS reacts to malicious events detected at runtime by adjusting the minimum compliance threshold C_T . For example when it senses an increasing attacker strength, it can increase the compliance threshold C_T with the objective to prevent impairment security failure. This results in a smaller false negative probability, which has a positive effect of reducing the number of bad nodes in the system and decreasing the probability of impairment security failure. However it also results in a larger false positive probability, which has a negative effect of reducing the number of good nodes in the system and consequently increasing the probability of Byzantine security failure. To compensate for the negative effect, the IDRS increases the audit rate (by decreasing the intrusion detection interval) or increases the number of detectors to reduce the false positive probability at the expense of more energy consumption. The relationship between the minimum compliance threshold C_T set vs. p_{fn} and p_{fp} must be determined at static time so the system can adjust C_T dynamically in response to malicious events detected at runtime.

III. MODEL AND ANALYSIS

Table I lists the set of parameters used in our model-based analysis of intrusion detection and response designs. The parameter N defines the starting network size (i.e., the number of nodes). The hostility of the network is characterized by a per-node capture rate λ_c ; p_{fp} and p_{fn} are host IDS false positive and false negative probabilities, respectively, while \mathcal{P}_{fp} and \mathcal{P}_{fn} are system-level IDS false positive and false negative probabilities, respectively; T_{IDS} is the intrusion detection interval; m is the number of detectors used in the system IDS.

Our theoretical model utilizes Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) techniques [8]. Figure 1 shows the SPN model describing the ecosystem of a CPS with intrusion detection and response under capture, impairment and Byzantine security attacks. The underlying model of the SPN model is a continuous-time semi-Markov process with a state representation $(N_g, N_b, N_e, impaired, energy)$ where N_g is the number of good nodes,

TABLE I
PARAMETERS USED FOR ANALYSIS OF INTRUSION DETECTION AND RESPONSE DESIGN

Parameter	Meaning	Type
N	number of nodes in a CPS	input
λ_c	per node compromise rate (Hz)	input
p_{fp}	probability of per-host IDS false positive	input
p_{fn}	probability of per-host IDS false negative	input
T_{IDS}	intrusion detection interval (s)	input
m	number of detectors in the system IDS	input
\mathcal{P}_{fp}	probability of system IDS false positive	derived
\mathcal{P}_{fn}	probability of system IDS false negative	derived
\mathcal{P}_{random}	random attack probability by a random attacker	input
p_a	attack probability by an insidious attacker	derived
N_{IDS}	maximum IDS cycles before energy exhaustion	derived
MTTF	system lifetime	output

TABLE II
TRANSITION RATES OF THE SPN MODEL.

Transition Name	Rate
TENERGY	$\frac{1}{N_{IDS} \times T_{IDS}}$
TCP	$N_g \times \lambda_c$
TFP	$N_g \times \mathcal{P}_{fp}$
TIDS	$\frac{T_{IDS}}{N_b \times (1 - \mathcal{P}_{fn})}$
TIF	$p_a \times N_b \times \lambda_{if}$

N_b is the number of bad nodes, N_e is the number of nodes evicted (as they are considered as bad nodes by intrusion detection), *impaired* is a binary variable with 1 indicating impairment security failure, and *energy* is a binary variable with 1 indicating energy availability and 0 indicating energy exhaustion.




Fig. 1. SPN Model for Intrusion Detection and Response.

Table II annotates transitions and gives transition rates used in the SPN model. The SPN model shown in Figure 1 is constructed as follows:

- We use places to hold tokens each representing a node. Initially, all N nodes are good nodes (e.g., 128 in our reference CPS) and put in place N_g as tokens.
- We use transitions to model events. Specifically, TCP models good nodes being compromised; TFP models a good node being falsely identified as compromised; TIDS models a bad node being detected correctly.
- Good nodes may become compromised because of capture attacks with per-node compromising rate λ_c .

This is modeled by associating transition TCP with an aggregate rate $\lambda_c \times N_g$. Firing TCP will move tokens one at a time (if it exists) from place N_g to place N_b . Tokens in place N_b represent bad nodes performing impairment attacks with probability p_a .

- When a bad node is detected by the system IDS as compromised, the number of compromised nodes evicted will be incremented by 1, so place N_e will hold one more token. On the other hand, the number of undetected compromised nodes will be decremented by 1, i.e., place N_b will hold one less token. These detection events are modeled by associating transition TIDS with a rate of $\frac{N_b \times (1 - \mathcal{P}_{fn})}{T_{IDS}}$ with $1 - \mathcal{P}_{fn}$ accounting for the system IDS true negative probability.
- The system-level IDS can incorrectly identify a good node as compromised. This is modeled by moving a good node in place N_g to place N_e from firing transition TFP with a rate of $\frac{N_g \times \mathcal{P}_{fp}}{T_{IDS}}$ with \mathcal{P}_{fp} accounting for the system IDS false positive probability.
- The system energy is exhausted after time $N_{IDS} \times T_{IDS}$ where N_{IDS} is the maximum number of intrusion detection intervals the CPS can possibly perform before it exhausts its energy due to performing ranging, sensing, and intrusion detection functions. It can be estimated by considering the amount of energy consumed in each T_{IDS} interval. This energy exhaustion event is modeled by placing a token in place *energy* initially and firing transition TENERGY with rate $\frac{1}{N_{IDS} \times T_{IDS}}$. When the energy exhaustion event occurs, the token in place *energy* will be vanished and the system enters an absorbing state meaning the lifetime is over. This is modeled by disabling all transitions in the SPN model.
- When the number of bad nodes (i.e., tokens in place N_b) is at least 1/3 of the total number of nodes (tokens in place N_g and N_b), the system fails because of a Byzantine failure. The system lifetime is over and is modeled again by disabling all transitions in the SPN model.
- Bad nodes in place N_b perform attacks with probability p_a and cause impairment to the system. After an impairment-failure time period is elapsed, heavy impairment due to attacks will result in a security failure. We model this by firing transition TIF with a rate of $p_a \times N_b \times \lambda_{if}$ indicating the amount of time needed by $p_a N_b$ bad nodes to reach this level of impairment beyond which the system cannot sustain the damage. The value of λ_{if} is system specific and is determined by domain experts predicting the amount of time needed for a bad node to cause severe functional impairment. A token is flown into place *impaired* when such a security failure occurs. Once a token is in place *impaired*, the system enters an absorbing state meaning the lifetime is over. Again it is modeled by disabling all transitions in the SPN model.

Here we note that the last two bullet points cover the two conditions that would cause a security failure.

We utilize the SPN model to analyze two design tradeoffs:

- Detection strength vs. energy consumption: As we increase the detection frequency (a smaller T_{IDS}) or the number of detectors (a larger m), the detection strength increases, thus preventing the system from running into a security failure. However, this increases the rate at which energy is consumed, thus resulting in a shorter lifetime. Consequently, there is an optimal setting of T_{IDS} and m under which the system MTTF is maximized, given the node capture rate and attack model.
- Detection response vs. attacker strength: As the random attack probability p_a decreases, the attacker strength decreases, thus lowering the probability of security failure due to impairment attacks. However, compromised nodes become more hidden and difficult to detect because they leave less evidence traceable, resulting in a higher per-host false negative probability p_{fn} and consequently a higher system-level false negative probability \mathcal{P}_{fn} . This increases the probability of security failure due to Byzantine attacks. The system can respond to instantaneous attacker strength detected and adjust C_T to trade a high per-host false positive probability p_{fp} off for a low per-host false negative probability p_{fn} , or vice versa, so as to minimize the probability of security failure. Hence, there exists an optimal setting of C_T as a function of attacker strength detected at time t under which the system security failure probability is minimized.

Let L be a binary random variable denoting the lifetime of the system such that it takes on the value of 1 if the system is alive at time t and 0 otherwise. Then, the expected value of L is the reliability of the system $R(t)$ at time t . Consequently, the integration of $R(t)$ from $t = 0$ to ∞ gives the mean time to failure (MTTF) or the average lifetime of the system we aim to maximize. The binary value assignment to L can be done by means of a reward function assigning a reward r_i of 0 or 1 to state i at time t as follows:

$$r_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if system is alive in state } i \\ 0 & \text{if system fails due to security or energy failure} \end{cases}$$

A state is represented by the distribution of tokens to places in the SPN model. For example, with the SPN model defined in Figure 1, the underlying state is represented by $(N_g, N_b, N_e, \textit{impaired}, \textit{energy})$. When place *energy* contains zero token, it indicates energy exhaustion. When N_g is less than or equal to twice of N_b , it indicates a Byzantine failure. When place *impaired* contains a token, it indicates a security failure due to significant functional impairment. Once the binary value of 0 or 1 is assigned to all states of the system as described above, the reliability of the system $R(t)$ is the expected value of L weighted on the probability of the system stays at a particular state at time t , which we can obtain easily from solving the SPN model using SPNP [8]. The MTTF of the system is equal to the cumulative reward to absorption, i.e.,

$$MTTF = \int_0^{\infty} R(t) dt \quad (7)$$

which we can again compute easily using SPNP.

IV. PARAMETERIZATION

TABLE III
PARAMETERS AND THEIR VALUES FOR THE REFERENCE CPS.

Parameter	Meaning	Default value
N	number of nodes or network size	128
\bar{n}	number of neighbors within radio range	32
p_{fn}	per-host false negative probability	[1-20%]
p_{fp}	per-host false positive probability	[1-20%]
λ_c	per-node capture rate	1/[1-24hr]
T_{IDS}	intrusion detection interval	[1-60min]
m	number of intrusion detectors per node	[3,11]
α	number of ranging operations	5
E_t	energy for transmission per node	0.000125 J
E_r	energy for reception per node	0.00005 J
E_a	energy for analyzing data per node	0.00174 J
E_s	energy for sensing per node	0.0005 J
E_o	initial system energy	16128 kJ

We consider the reference CPS model introduced in Section II operating in a 2×2 area with a network size (N) of 128 nodes. Hence, the number of neighbors within radio range, denoted by \bar{n} , initially is about $128/4=32$ nodes. A node in our reference CPS uses a 35 Wh battery, so its energy is 126000 J. The system energy initially, denoted by E_o , is therefore $126000 \text{ J} \times 128 = 16128000 \text{ J}$. Table III lists the set of parameters and their values for the reference CPS.

A. System-Level IDS \mathcal{P}_{fn} and \mathcal{P}_{fp}

We first parameterize the system IDS \mathcal{P}_{fn} and \mathcal{P}_{fp} given per-host IDS false positive probability p_{fp} and per-host IDS false negative probability as input. We first note that \mathcal{P}_{fn} and \mathcal{P}_{fp} highly depend on the attacker behavior. A persistent attacker constantly performs slandering attacks such that it will vote a bad node as a good node, and conversely a good node as a bad node, to eventually cause a security failure. However, a random or an insidious attacker will only perform slandering attacks randomly with probability p_a to avoid detection.

We first differentiate the number of active bad nodes, N_b^a , from the number of inactive bad nodes, N_b^i , with $N_b^a + N_b^i = N_b$, such that at any time:

$$N_b^a = p_a \times N_b \quad (8)$$

$$N_b^i = (1 - p_a) \times N_b \quad (9)$$

The difference between an active bad node and an inactive bad node is that an inactive bad node behaves as if it were a good node in order to evade detection, including casting votes the same way as a good node would, when it participates in the system-level IDS voting process.

For a persistent attacker, $p_a = 1$. For a random attacker, $p_a = p_{random}$. For an insidious attacker, to maximize the benefit of colluding attacks, a compromised node stays dormant until a critical mass of compromised nodes is gathered so that $p_a = 1$ when $N_b \geq N_b^T$, and $p_a = 0$ otherwise, where N_b^T is a parameter reflecting the insidiousness degree. In other words, all bad nodes engage in active attacks when there is a critical mass of compromised nodes in the system.

We calculate \mathcal{P}_{fn} by Equation 10. The equation for \mathcal{P}_{fp}^p is the same except replacing p_{fn} by p_{fp} in the right hand side expression.

We explain Equation 10 for obtaining \mathcal{P}_{fn} in detail below. The explanation for \mathcal{P}_{fp} follows the same logic. In Equation 10, m this is the number of detectors and m_a is the majority of m . The first summation aggregates the probability of a false negative stemming from selecting a majority of active bad nodes. That is, it is equal to the number of ways to choose a majority of m nodes from the set of active bad nodes times the number of ways to choose a minority of m nodes from the set of good nodes and inactive bad nodes divided by the number of ways to choose m nodes from the set of all good and bad nodes. The second summation aggregates the probability of a false negative stemming from selecting a minority of m nodes from the set of active bad nodes which always cast incorrect votes, coupled with selecting a sufficient number of nodes from the set of good nodes and inactive bad nodes which make incorrect votes with probability p_{fn} , resulting in a majority of incorrect votes being cast.

B. Host IDS p_{fn} and p_{fp}

Next we parameterize the host IDS false negative probability p_{fn} and false positive probability p_{fp} for persistent, random and insidious attacks. The system, after a thorough testing and debugging phase, determines a minimum threshold C_T such that p_{fn} and p_{fp} measured based on Equations 5 and 6 are acceptable to system design. Let p_{fn}^p and p_{fp}^p be the false negative probability and the false positive probability of the host IDS when $p_a = 1$ (e.g., under persistent attacks). Let the minimum threshold C_T value set for the persistent attack case be denoted by C_T^p .

Let p_{fn}^r and p_{fp}^r be the false negative probability and the false positive probability of the host IDS when $p_a < 1$ (e.g., under random attacks). For the case of random attacks with probability $p_a < 1$, conceivably the amount of evidence observable from a bad node would be diminished proportional to p_a . Consequently, with the same minimum threshold C_T^p being used, the host false negative probability would increase. We again utilize Equations 5 and 6 to obtain p_{fn}^r and p_{fp}^r for each given p_a value during the testing and debugging phase. Here we note that the host false positive probability would remain the same, i.e., $p_{fp}^r = p_{fp}^p$ because the attacker behavior does not affect false positives, given the same minimum threshold C_T^p being used.

Lastly let p_{fn}^i and p_{fp}^i be the false negative probability and the false positive probability of the host IDS under insidious attacks. Obviously, the false positive probability is not affected, so $p_{fp}^i = p_{fp}^p$. Since insidious nodes stay dormant until a critical mass is achieved to perform ‘‘all in’’ attacks, the false negative probability is one during the dormant period and is equal to that under persistent attacks during the ‘‘all in’’ attack period. Specifically,

$$p_{fn}^i = \begin{cases} p_{fn}^p & \text{if } N_b \geq N_b^T \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{fn} = \sum_{i=0}^{m-m_a} \left[\frac{\binom{N_b^a}{m_a+i} \binom{N_g+N_b^i}{m-(m_a+i)}}{\binom{N_g+N_b^a+N_b^i}{m}} \right] + \sum_{j=0}^{m-m_a} \left[\frac{\binom{N_b^a}{j} \sum_{k=m_a-j}^{m-j} \left[\binom{N_g+N_b^i}{k} (p_{fn})^k \binom{N_g+N_b^i-k}{m-j-k} (1-p_{fn})^{(m-j-k)} \right]}{\binom{N_g+N_b^i+N_b^a}{m}} \right] \quad (10)$$

TABLE IV

β IN BETA(1, β) AND RESULTING p_{fn} AND p_{fp} VALUES UNDER VARIOUS ATTACK MODELS.

Attack Type	β	p_{fn}	p_{fp}
Random with $P_a=1.000$ (Persistent)	1.20	6.3%	7.3%
Random with $P_a=0.800$	1.00	10.0%	7.3%
Random with $P_a=0.400$	0.75	17.8%	7.3%
Random with $P_a=0.200$	0.50	31.6%	7.3%
Random with $P_a=0.100$	0.20	63.1%	7.3%
Random with $P_a=0.050$	0.13	74.1%	7.3%
Random with $P_a=0.025$	0.09	81.3%	7.3%
Insidious	0; 1.20	100%; 6.3%	7.3%

Here we note that p_{fn} and p_{fp} obtained above for persistent, random, or insidious attacks would be a function of time as input to Equation 10 for calculating system-level IDS \mathcal{P}_{fn} and \mathcal{P}_{fp} dynamically.

We apply the statistical analysis described by Equations 1-4 to get the maximum likelihood estimates of β (with α set as 1) under each attacker behavior model and then utilize Equations 5 and 6 to yield p_{fn} and p_{fp} . The system minimum threshold C_T is set to $C_T^p = 0.9$ to yield $p_{fn}^p = 6.3\%$ and $p_{fp}^p = 7.3\%$. Table IV summarizes β values and the resulting p_{fn} and p_{fp} values under various attacker behavior models. The persistent attack model is a special case in which $p_a = 1$. The insidious attack model is another special case in which $p_a = 1$ during the ‘‘all in’’ attack period and $p_a = 0$ during the dormant period.

C. Parameterizing C_T for Dynamic Intrusion Response

The parameterization of p_{fn} and p_{fp} above is based on a constant C_T being used (i.e., $C_T^p=0.9$). A dynamic IDS response design is to adjust C_T in response to the attacker strength detected with the goal to maximize the system lifetime. The attacker strength of a node, say node i , may be estimated periodically by node i 's intrusion detectors. That is, the compliance degree value of node i , $X_i(t)$, as collected by m intrusion detectors based on observations collected during $[t - T_{IDS}, t]$, is compared against the minimum threshold C_T^p set for persistent attacks. If $X_i(t) < C_T^p$ then node i is considered a bad node performing active attacks at time t ; otherwise it is a good node. This information is passed to the control module who subsequently estimates $N_b^a(t)$ representing the attacker strength at time t .

In this paper we investigate a simple yet efficient IDS response design. The basic idea is to decrease the per-host false

negative probability p_{fn} when the attacker strength is high, so we may quickly remove active attackers from the system to prevent impairment failure. This is achieved by increasing the C_T value. Conversely, when there is little attacker evidence detected, we lower C_T so we may quickly decrease the probability of a good node being misidentified as a bad node, i.e., lowering the per-host false positive probability, to prevent Byzantine failure.

While there are many possible ways to dynamically control C_T , in this paper we consider a linear one-to-one mapping function as follows:

$$C_T(t) = C_T^p + \delta_{C_T} \times (N_b^a - 1) \quad (12)$$

Here $C_T(t)$ refers to the C_T value set at time t as a response to the attacker strength measured by $N_b^a(t)$ detected at time t ; C_T^p is the minimum threshold set by the system for the persistent attack case; and δ_{C_T} is the increment to C_T per active bad node detected. Essentially we set C_T to C_T^p when $N_b^a(t)$ detected at time t is 1, and linearly increase (or decrease) C_T with increasing (or decreasing) attacker strength detected. With $C_T^p = 0.9$ in our CPS reference system, we set $\delta_{C_T} = 0.5$ and parameterize $C_T(t)$ as follows:

$$C_T(t) = \begin{cases} 0.85 & \text{if } N_b^a = 0 \\ 0.90 & \text{if } N_b^a = 1 \\ 0.95 & \text{if } N_b^a = 2 \\ 0.99 & \text{if } N_b^a \geq 3 \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

Note that when C_T is closer to 1, a node will more likely be considered as compromised even if it wanders only for a small amount of time in insecure states. A large C_T induces a small per-host false negative probability p_{fn} at the expense of a large per-host false positive probability p_{fp} .

D. Energy

Lastly, we parameterize N_{IDS} , the maximum number of intrusion detection cycles the system can possibly perform before energy exhaustion, as follows:

$$N = \frac{E_o}{E_{T_{IDS}}} \quad (14)$$

where E_o is the initial energy of the reference CPS and $E_{T_{IDS}}$ is the energy consumed per T_{IDS} interval due to ranging, sensing, and intrusion detection functions, calculated as:

$$E_{T_{IDS}} = n \times (E_{ranging} + E_{sensing} + E_{detection}) \quad (15)$$

where $E_{ranging}$, $E_{sensing}$, $E_{detection}$ stand for energy spent for ranging, sensing, and intrusion detection in a T_{IDS} interval, respectively. Here the energy spent per node is multiplied with the node population in the CPS to get the total energy spent by all nodes per cycle.

In Equation 15, $E_{ranging}$ stands for the energy spent for periodic ranging. It is calculated as:

$$E_{ranging} = \alpha \times [E_t + \bar{n} \times (E_r + E_a)] \quad (16)$$

Here a node spends E_t energy to transmit a CDMA waveform. Its \bar{n} neighbors each spend E_r energy to receive the waveform and each spend E_a energy to transform it into distance. This operation is repeated for α times for determining a sequence of locations. In Equation 15, $E_{sensing}$ stands for the amount of energy consumed due to periodic sensing. It is computed as:

$$E_{sensing} = \bar{n} \times (E_s + E_a). \quad (17)$$

Here a node spends E_s energy for sensing navigation and multipath mitigation data and E_a energy for analyzing sensed data for each of its \bar{n} neighbors. Finally, $E_{detection}$ stands for the energy used for performing intrusion detection on a target node. It can be calculated by:

$$E_{detection} = m \times (E_t + \bar{n} \cdot E_r) + m \times (E_t + (m-1) \cdot (E_r + E_a)). \quad (18)$$

Here we consider the energy required to choose m intrusion detectors to evaluate a target node (the first term) and the energy required for m intrusion detectors to vote (the second term). Specifically, the first term is the number of intrusion detectors times the cost of transmitting plus the number of nodes in radio range times the cost of receiving. The second term is the number of intrusion detectors times the cost of transmitting plus the number of peer intrusion detectors times the cost of receiving plus the cost of analyzing the vote.

V. NUMERICAL DATA

In this section we present numerical data for reliability assessment as a result of executing intrusion detection and response in a CPS. Our objective is to identify optimal design settings in terms of the optimal values of T_{IDS} , m and C_T under which we can best trade off energy consumption vs. intrusion detection, as well as response effectiveness vs. impairment security failure to maximize the system MTTF, when given a set of parameter values characterizing the operational and networking conditions.

A. Effect of Intrusion Detection Strength

We first examine the effect of intrusion detection strength measured by the intrusion interval, T_{IDS} , and the number of intrusion detectors, m . We only present results for the reference CPS under persistent attacks, as the results for other types of attacks show similar trends.

Figure 2 shows MTTF vs. T_{IDS} as the number of detectors (m) in the system-level IDS varies over the range of [3,11] in increments of 2. We see that there exists an optimal T_{IDS} value at which the system lifetime is maximized to best

tradeoff energy consumption vs. intrusion tolerance. Initially when T_{IDS} is too small, the system performs ranging, sensing and intrusion detection too frequently and quickly exhausts its energy, resulting in a small lifetime. As T_{IDS} increases, the system saves more energy and its lifetime increases. Finally when T_{IDS} is too large, although the system can save even more energy, it fails to catch bad nodes often enough, resulting in the system having many bad nodes. Bad nodes through active attacks can cause impairment security failure. Furthermore, when the system has 1/3 or more bad nodes out of the total population, a Byzantine failure ensues. We observe that the optimal T_{IDS} value at which the system MTTF is maximized is sensitive to the m value. The general trend is that as m increases, the optimal T_{IDS} value decreases. Here we observe that $m = 7$ is optimal to yield the maximum MTTF because too many intrusion detectors would induce energy exhaustion failure, while too few intrusion detectors would induce security failure. Using $m = 7$ can best balance energy exhaustion failure vs. security failure for high reliability.




Fig. 2. MTTF vs. T_{IDS} and m .




Fig. 3. MTTF vs. T_{IDS} and λ_c .

Figure 3 shows MTTF vs. T_{IDS} as the compromising rate

λ_c varies over the range of once per 4 hours to once per 24 hours to test the sensitivity of MTTF with respect to λ_c (with m fixed at five to isolate its effect). We first observe that as λ_c increases, MTTF decreases because a higher λ_c will cause more compromised nodes to be present in the system. We also observe that the optimal T_{IDS} decreases as λ_c increases. This is because when more compromised nodes exist, the system needs to execute intrusion detection more frequently to maximize MTTF. Figure 3 identifies the best T_{IDS} to be used to maximize the lifetime of the reference CPS to balance energy exhaustion vs. security failure, when given C_T and λ_c characterizing the operational and networking conditions of the system.

B. Effect of Attacker Behavior

In this section, we analyze the effect of various attacker behavior models, including persistent (with $p_a = 1$, p_{fn}^i and p_{fp}^i given as input), random (with $p_a = p_{random}$, p_{fn}^i , and p_{fp}^i given as input), and insidious attacks (with $p_a = 1$ when $N_b \geq N_b^T = 10$ and $p_a = 0$ otherwise, p_{fp}^i , and p_{fn}^i defined by Equation 11 given as input). The analysis conducted here is based on static C_T . In the next section, we will analyze the effect of dynamic C_T as a response to attacker strength detected at runtime.

Figure 4 shows MTTF vs. T_{IDS} with varying p_{random} values. We first observe that the system MTTF is low when p_{random} is small (e.g., $p_{random} = 0.025$). This is because when p_{random} is small, most bad nodes are dormant and remain in the system without being detected. Thus, the system suffers from Byzantine failure quickly, leading to a low MTTF. As p_{random} increases from 0.025 to 0.2, the system MTTF increases because of a higher chance of bad nodes being detected and removed from the system, thus reducing the probability of Byzantine security failure. As p_{random} increases further, however, the system MTTF decreases again because of a higher probability of impairment security failure as there will be more bad nodes actively performing impairment attacks. In the extreme case of $p_{random} = 1$, all bad nodes perform attacks and the system failure is mainly caused by impairment. The maximum MTTF occurs when $p_{random} = 0.2$ at which point the probability of security failure due to either type of security attacks is minimized. Here we should note that the result of $p_{random} = 0.2$ yielding the highest MTTF is a balance of impairment security failure rate vs. Byzantine failure rate dictated by the parameter settings of the reference CPS as given in Tables III and IV.

Figure 5 compares MTTF vs. T_{IDS} of the reference CPS under the three attacker types head-to-head. It shows that the MTTF is the highest for the reference CPS under random attacks. The MTTF of the CPS under persistent attacks is the second highest. As expected, the reference CPS under insidious attacks has the lowest MTTF. We attribute this to the fact that unlike persistent attacks which aim to cause impairment failure, insidious attacks while dormant can cause Byzantine failure and while “all in” can also cause impairment failure. The extent to which the system MTTF




Fig. 4. MTTF vs. T_{IDS} and p_{random} .

differs depends on the relative rate at which impairment failure vs. Byzantine failure occurs. The former is dictated by λ_{if} and the latter is dictated by how fast the Byzantine failure condition is satisfied. The result that the MTTF difference between persistent attacks (the second curve) and insidious attacks (the last curve) is relatively significant is due to a large Byzantine failure rate compared with the impairment failure rate. On the other hand, the reference CPS under random attacks can more effectively prevent either Byzantine failure or impairment failure from occurring by removing bad nodes as soon as they perform attacks. The system MTTF difference between random vs. persistent attacks again depends on the relative rate at which impairment failure vs. Byzantine failure occurs.




Fig. 5. MTTF vs. T_{IDS} and adversary type.

C. Effect of Intrusion Response

In this section, we analyze the effect of intrusion response, i.e., dynamic C_T as a response to attacker strength detected at runtime, on the system MTTF.

Figure 6 shows MTTF vs. T_{IDS} under the static C_T design and the dynamic C_T design for the persistent attack case. We

see there is a significant gain in MTTF under dynamic C_T over static C_T . The reason is that with persistent attacks, all bad nodes are actively performing attacks, so the system is better off by increasing C_T to a high level to quickly remove bad nodes to prevent impairment failure. We also observe that in the case the optimal T_{IDS} at which MTTF is maximized decreases compared with the static C_T case so to as quickly remove bad nodes from the system.




Fig. 6. Static vs. Dynamic Response under Persistent Attacks.




Fig. 7. Static vs. Dynamic Response under Random Attacks.

Figure 7 shows MTTF vs. T_{IDS} under the static C_T design and the dynamic C_T design for the random attack case with $p_{random} = 0.2$. We pick the case of $p_{random} = 0.2$ because it yields the highest MTTF among all random attack cases in the reference CPS system (see Figure 4). Here again we observe that dynamic C_T performs significantly better than static C_T , when operating at the identified optimal T_{IDS} value. The optimal T_{IDS} value under dynamic C_T design again is smaller than that under static C_T design to quickly remove nodes that perform active attacks.

Figure 8 shows MTTF vs. T_{IDS} under the static C_T design and the dynamic C_T design for the insidious attack case. Here

we observe the MTTF difference is relatively small compared with persistent or random attacks. The reason is that bad nodes do not perform active attacks until a critical mass is reached, so dynamic C_T would set a lower C_T value during the dormant period while rapidly setting a higher C_T value during the attack period. Since the attack period is relatively short compared with the dormant period, the gain in MTTF isn't very significant. Nevertheless, we observe even for insidious attacks, dynamic C_T still performs better than static C_T .

As our C_T dynamic control function (Equation 12) adjusts C_T solely based on the attacker strength detected regardless of the attacker type, we conclude that the dynamic C_T design as a response to attacker strength detected at runtime can improve MTTF compared with the static C_T design.




Fig. 8. Static vs. Dynamic Response under Insidious Attacks.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we developed a probability model to analyze reliability of a cyber physical system in the presence of both malicious nodes exhibiting a range of attacker behaviors, and an intrusion detection and response system for detecting and responding to malicious events at runtime. For each attacker behavior, we identified the best detection strength (in terms of the detection interval and the number of detectors), and the best response strength (in terms of the per-host minimum compliance threshold for setting the false positive and negative probabilities) under which the reliability of the system may be maximized.

There are several future research directions, including (a) investigating other intrusion detection criteria (e.g., based on accumulation of deviation from good states) other than the current binary criterion used in the paper based on a minimum compliance threshold to improve the false negative probability without compromising the false positive probability; (b) investigating other intrusion response criteria (e.g., exponential increase of the minimum compliance threshold) other than the linear function used in the paper and analyzing the effect on the system lifetime; (c) exploring other attack behavior models (e.g., an oracle attacker that can adjust the attacker strength

depending on the detection strength to maximize security failure) and investigating the best dynamic response design to cope with such attacks; (d) developing a more elaborate model to describe the relationship between intrusion responses and attacker behaviors and justifying such a relationship model by means of extensive empirical studies; and (e) extending the analysis to hierarchically-structured intrusion detection and response system design for a large CPS consisting of multiple enclaves each comprising heterogeneous entities subject to different operational and environment conditions and attack threats.

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