

# From Uncertainty to Belief: Inferring the Specification Within

Ted Kremenek<sup>†</sup> Paul Twohey<sup>†</sup> Godmar Back<sup>‡</sup> Andrew Y. Ng<sup>†</sup> Dawson Engler<sup>†</sup>

*Computer Science Department<sup>†</sup>  
Stanford University  
Stanford, CA, U.S.A.*

*Computer Science Department<sup>‡</sup>  
Virginia Tech  
Blacksburg, VA, U.S.A.*

## Abstract

*Automatic tools for finding software errors require a set of specifications before they can check code: if they do not know what to check, they cannot find bugs. This paper presents a novel framework based on factor graphs for automatically inferring specifications directly from programs. The key strength of the approach is that it can incorporate many disparate sources of evidence, allowing us to squeeze significantly more information from our observations than previously published techniques.*

*We illustrate the strengths of our approach by applying it to the problem of inferring what functions in C programs allocate and release resources. We evaluated its effectiveness on five codebases: SDL, OpenSSH, GIMP, and the OS kernels for Linux and Mac OS X (XNU). For each codebase, starting with zero initially provided annotations, we observed an inferred annotation accuracy of 80-90%, with often near perfect accuracy for functions called as little as five times. Many of the inferred allocator and deallocator functions are functions for which we both lack the implementation and are rarely called — in some cases functions with at most one or two callsites. Finally, with the inferred annotations we quickly found both missing and incorrect properties in a specification used by a commercial static bug-finding tool.*

## 1 Introduction

Many effective tools exist for finding software errors [4, 5, 8, 15, 18, 28, 33]. While different in many respects, they are identical in one: if they do not know what to check, they cannot find bugs. In general, tools require specifications that document what a program *should* do in order for the tool to discern good program behavior from bad. Undetected errors due to missing specifications are a serious form of false negatives that plague sound and unsound bug-finding tools alike. From our own experience with developing such tools, we believe that legions of bugs remain undetected in systems previously “vetted” by checking tools simply because they lack the required specifications, and not because tools lack the necessary analysis precision.

Furthermore, checking tools generally operate without safety nets. There is no mechanism to discover when bugs in the checking tool lead to missed errors in checked code. Analysis bugs are a source of false negatives; while an unsound tool may have false negatives by design, even

a sound tool can have false negatives due to implementation bugs. In our experience this is a serious concern: if an analysis bug does not cause a false positive, the only way to catch it is by comparison against regression runs.

The result of all these factors is that checking tools miss many bugs they could catch. Unfortunately, acquiring accurate specifications can be daunting at best. Even with state-of-the-art annotation systems, the manual labor needed to specify high-level invariant properties for large programs can be overwhelming [12, 35]. Further, in large, evolving codebases with many developers, interfaces may change rapidly as functions are added and removed. This churn exacerbates the problem of keeping a specification, if there is one, current.

Fortunately, there are many sources of knowledge, intuitions, and domain-specific observations that can be automatically leveraged to help infer specifications from programs directly. First and foremost, the behavior of programs is well-structured, with recognizable patterns of behavior implying high-level roles for the objects in a program. For example, functions that allocate and release resources (such as file handles and memory) vary widely in their implementations, but their interfaces are used nearly identically. In essence, the behavior of a program reflects what the programmer intended it to do, and the more we observe that one or more objects appear to interact in a recognizable role, the more we believe that role reflects their true purpose. More plainly, the more something behaves like an *X* the more we believe it is an *X*. Thus, leveraging such information has the desired property that the amount of evidence garnered about a program’s specification grows in the amount of code analyzed. In addition, we often have a volume of valuable, non-numeric ad hoc information such as domain-specific naming conventions (e.g., a function name containing the word “alloc” often implies the function is an allocator).

This paper presents a novel, scalable, and customizable framework for automatically inferring specifications from programs. The specifications we infer come in the form of annotations, which are able to describe many kinds of important program properties. The key strength of our approach is that it tightly binds together many disparate sources of evidence. The result is that any information about one object becomes indirect information about related objects, allowing us to squeeze sig-

nificantly more information from our observations than previously published approaches. Our framework can incorporate many sources of information: analysis results from bug-finding tools, ad hoc knowledge, and already known annotations (when available). Moreover, because the technique is built upon a probabilistic model called a *factor graph* [21,36], it is fully capable of fusing multiple sources of information to infer specifications while handling the inherent uncertainty in our information sources and the often noisy relationships between the properties we wish to infer. Further, inferred annotations can be immediately employed to effectively find bugs even *before* the annotations are inspected by a user.

This last feature makes our framework pragmatic even for rapidly evolving codebases: the process of inferring annotations and using those annotations to check code with automated tools can be integrated into a nightly regression run. In the process of the daily inspection of bug reports generated by the nightly run, some of the inferred annotations will be inspected by a user. These now known annotations can subsequently be exploited on the next nightly regression to better infer the remaining uninspected annotations. Thus, our framework incrementally accrues knowledge about a project without a huge initial investment of user labor.

This paper makes the following contributions.

1. We present Annotation Factor Graphs (AFGs), a group of probabilistic graphical models that we have architected specifically for inferring annotations.
2. We illustrate how information from program analysis as well as different kinds of ad hoc knowledge can be readily incorporated into an AFG.
3. We reduce the process of inferring annotations with an AFG to factor graph inference and describe important optimizations specific to incorporating information from static program analysis into an AFG.
4. We provide a thorough evaluation of the technique using the example of inferring resource management functions, and illustrate how our technique scales to large codebases with high accuracy. Further, we show that with our results we have found both missing and incorrect properties in a specification used by a commercial bug-finding tool (Coverity Prevent [7]).

Section 2 presents a complete example of inferring specifications from a small code fragment, which introduces the key ideas of our approach. Section 3 uses the example to lay the theoretical foundations, which Section 4 further formalizes. Section 5 refines the approach and shows more advanced AFG modeling techniques. Section 6 discusses the computational mechanics of our inference technique. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in Section 7, discuss related work in Section 8, and then conclude.

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```
FILE * fp = fopen("myfile.txt", "r");
fread( buffer, n, 1000, fp );
fclose( fp );
```

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**Figure 1:** Simple example involving a C file handle: `fopen` “allocates” the handle, `fread` uses it, and `fclose` releases it.

## 2 Motivating Example

We now present a complete example of inferring specifications from a small code fragment. This example, along with the solution presented in the next section, serves to introduce many of the core ideas of our technique.

### 2.1 Problem: Inferring Ownership Roles


Application and systems code manages a myriad of resources such as allocated heap objects, file handles, and database connections. Mismanagement of resources can lead to bugs such as resource leaks and use-after-release errors. Although tools exist to find such bugs [17,18,28,32], all require a list of functions that can allocate and release resources (allocators and deallocators). Unfortunately, systems code often employs non-standard APIs to manage resources, causing tools to miss bugs.

A more general concept that subsumes knowing allocation and deallocation functions is knowing what functions return or claim ownership of a resource. Many C programs use the ownership idiom: a resource has at any time exactly one *owning* pointer, which must release the resource. Ownership can be transferred from a pointer by storing it into a data structure or by passing it to a function that claims it. A function that returns an owning pointer has the annotation *ro* (*returns ownership*) associated with its interface. A function that claims a pointer passed as an argument has the property *co* (*claims ownership*) associated with the corresponding formal parameter. In this model, allocators are *ro* functions, while deallocators are *co* functions.

Many *ro* functions have a contract similar to an allocator, but do not directly allocate resources. For example, a function that dequeues an object from a linked list and returns it to the caller. Once the object is removed from the list, the caller must ensure the object is fully processed. A similar narrative applies to *co* functions.

Consider the task of inferring what functions in a program return and claim ownership of resources. For example, assume we are given the code fragment in Figure 1 and are asked to determine if `fopen` is an *ro* and if either `fread` or `fclose` are *co*’s. Without prior knowledge about these functions, what can we conclude by looking at this fragment alone?

While we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, simple intuition renders some possibilities more likely than others. Because programs generally behave correctly, a person might first make the assumption that the code fragment is *likely* to be bug-free. This assumption elevates



**Figure 2:** DFA summarizing basic ownership rules. A pointer returned from a function call enters either the *Owned* or *¬Owned* state depending on whether the called function has the property *ro* or *¬ro* respectively. Function calls involving the pointer cause the DFA to transition states based on the *co* or *¬co* property associated with the called function. An “end-of-path” indicates no further uses of the pointer within the function. The two final states for the DFA indicate correct (*OK*) or incorrect use of the pointer (*Bug*).

the likelihood of two conclusions over all others.

First, *fopen* may be an *ro*, *fread* a function that uses *fp* but does not claim ownership of the resource (*¬co*), and *fclose* a *co*. For this case, the code fragment can be logically rewritten as:

$$fp = ro(); \neg co(fp); co(fp)$$

This conclusion follows if we assume the code fragment is correct. If *fopen* is an *ro*, then this assignment is the only one to all three functions that does not induce a bug. To avoid a resource-leak, either *fread* or *fclose* must be a *co*. To avoid a use-after-release error, however, *fread* cannot be a *co*. This leaves *fclose* being a *co*.

Here we have assumed that an owned pointer cannot be used after being claimed. This strict interpretation of the ownership idiom assumes that all *co*’s are deallocators. For now, the correctness rules for ownership that we use are summarized by the DFA in Figure 2, and we discuss refinements in Section 5.1

Continuing, the second likely assignment of ownership roles to these functions is that *fopen* is an *¬ro*, with both *fread* and *fclose* as *¬co*’s:

$$fp = \neg ro(); \neg co(fp); \neg co(fp);$$

We reach this conclusion using similar reasoning as before. If *fopen* is an *¬ro*, we no longer have the opportunity to leak an allocated resource, but as Figure 2 shows, it is now a bug to pass *fp* to a *co*.

Consequently, from simple reasoning we can infer much about these functions. Note that we are not *certain* of anything; we only *believe* that some conclusions are more likely than others. Further, we may be able to infer more about these functions by incorporating additional intuitions and knowledge. In the next section we discuss how to precisely formulate such reasoning.

### 3 The Big Picture

This section gives a crash course in our inference approach, tying it to the example just presented. By its end,

the reader will have a basic arsenal for inferring annotations, which the next sections extend.

Our goal is to provide a framework (a probabilistic model) that (1) allows users to easily express every intuition and domain-specific observation they have that is useful for inferring annotations and then (2) reduces such knowledge in a sound way to meaningful probabilities. In the process, the framework squeezes out all available information about the annotations we are inferring.

The inference framework must solve two common challenges. First, it must robustly handle noise. Otherwise its brittleness will prevent the exploitation of many observations that are only “often” true rather than always true (e.g., an observation that an annotation obeys a feature 51% of the time). Second, it must soundly combine uncertain information. Treated independently, a fact of which we are only partially certain is only marginally useful. However, aggregated with other sources of knowledge, one fact can be the missing link in a chain of evidence we would not otherwise be able to exploit.

Our annotation inference has three steps:

1. **Define** the set of possible annotations to infer.
2. **Model** domain-specific knowledge and intuitions in our probabilistic model.
3. **Compute** annotation probabilities using the model. These probabilities are then used to rank, from most-to-least probable: entire specifications, individual annotations, or errors.

We now apply these three steps to our motivating example. In general, annotations are implicitly defined by a correctness property that we wish to check in a program; we briefly describe it for our example (§ 3.1). We then describe the fundamental mechanics of our probabilistic model (§ 3.2), and how to model two basic properties: (1) the fact that the more something behaves like an *X* the more likely it is an *X* (§ 3.3) and (2) domain-specific prior beliefs (§ 3.4). We finish the section by computing the probabilities for the annotations in our example.

#### 3.1 Defining the Annotations to Infer

We use *annotation variables* to denote the program objects to which annotations bind. The example has three such variables: *fopen:ret*, *fread:4* and *fclose:1*. The variable *fopen:ret* corresponds to the possible annotations for the return value of *fopen*, and has the domain  $\{ro, \neg ro\}$ . The variables *fread:4* and *fclose:1* (where “*i*” denotes the *i*th formal parameter) have the domain  $\{co, \neg co\}$ . We have  $2^3 = 8$  combinations of values for these variables, and each represents a joint *specification* of the roles of all three functions. (For this paper, an annotation and its negation are mutually exclusive.) We denote the set of annotation variables as **A**. In our example,  $\mathbf{A} = \{fopen:ret, fread:4, fclose:1\}$ . Further, the notation

ANNOTATIONS				FACTOR VALUES				FACTOR PRODUCT	PROBABILITY
<i>fopen:ret</i>	<i>fread:4</i>	<i>fclose:1</i>	DFA	$f_{\langle check \rangle}$	$f_{\langle ro \rangle}(\textit{fopen:ret})$	$f_{\langle co \rangle}(\textit{fread:4})$	$f_{\langle co \rangle}(\textit{fclose:1})$	$\prod f$	$\frac{1}{Z} \prod f$
<i>ro</i>	$\neg co$	<i>co</i>	✓	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.3	0.151	<b>0.483</b>
$\neg ro$	$\neg co$	$\neg co$	✓	0.9	0.2	0.7	0.7	0.088	<b>0.282</b>
<i>ro</i>	$\neg co$	$\neg co$	✗	0.1	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.039	<b>0.125</b>
<i>ro</i>	<i>co</i>	$\neg co$	✗	0.1	0.8	0.3	0.7	0.017	<b>0.054</b>
<i>ro</i>	<i>co</i>	<i>co</i>	✗	0.1	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.007	<b>0.023</b>
$\neg ro$	$\neg co$	<i>co</i>	✗	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.004	<b>0.013</b>
$\neg ro$	<i>co</i>	$\neg co$	✗	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.004	<b>0.013</b>
$\neg ro$	<i>co</i>	<i>co</i>	✗	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.002	<b>0.006</b>

**Table 1:** Table depicting intermediate values used to compute  $P(\textit{fopen:ret}, \textit{fread:4}, \textit{fclose:1})$ . Specifications are sorted by their probabilities. The value  $Z$  is a normalizing constant computed by summing the column  $\prod f$ . By summing the values in the last column when  $\textit{fopen:ret} = ro$  we compute  $P(\textit{fopen:ret} = ro) \approx 0.7$ . The marginal probabilities  $P(\textit{fread:4} = \neg co) \approx 0.9$  and  $P(\textit{fclose:1} = co) \approx 0.52$  are similarly computed.

$\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{a}$  means that  $\mathbf{a}$  is some concrete assignment of values to *all* the variables in  $\mathbf{A}$ . Thus  $\mathbf{a}$  represents one possible complete specification, which in our example specifies ownership roles for all three functions.

Table 1 lists all possible specifications for Figure 1, and displays the intermediate values used to compute probabilities for each specification. We use this table throughout the remainder of this section. The “DFA” column indicates, for each specification, the final state of the DFA from Figure 2 when applied to the code example.

### 3.2 Modeling Beliefs for Annotations

The rest of the section shows how to express domain insights in our inference framework in terms of user-defined mathematical functions, called *factors*. The framework uses these factors to compute annotation probabilities, e.g. the probability  $P(\textit{fopen:ret} = ro)$  that the return value of `fopen` has the annotation *ro*.

Factors are relations mapping the possible values of one or more annotation variables to non-negative real numbers. More precisely, each factor  $f_i$  is a map from the possible values of a set of variables  $\mathbf{A}_i$  ( $\mathbf{A}_i \subseteq \mathbf{A}$ ) to  $[0, \infty)$ . Factors “score” an assignment of values to a group of related annotation variables, with higher values indicating more belief in an assignment. Although not required, for many factors the mapped values we specify are probabilities (i.e. sum to 1) because probabilities are intuitive to specify by hand.

Suppose we know that functions in a codebase that return a value of type `FILE*` have a higher chance of returning ownership (*ro*). We can express this tendency using a factor that, given the annotation label for the return value of a function with a `FILE*` return type, returns slightly higher weights for *ro* annotations than  $\neg ro$  annotations. For example, making  $f_{\text{FILE*}}(\textit{fopen:ret} = ro) = 0.51$  and  $f_{\text{FILE*}}(\textit{fopen:ret} = \neg ro) = 0.49$ . Note that the magnitude of the values is not important, but rather their relative *odds*. We could have used 51 and 49 instead, implying an odds of 51:49 to prefer *ro* over  $\neg ro$  annotations. While trivial, this example illustrates a couple of recurrent themes. First, the observations we want to exploit for inference are often tendencies and not laws — as long as these tendencies are right more often than wrong,

they convey useful information. The ratio that their associated factor returns reflects the reliability of a tendency — big ratios for very reliable tendencies, smaller ratios for mildly reliable ones. Second, factors work well in our domain since (1) they let the user express any computable intuition in terms of a custom function and (2) inference intuitions naturally reduce to preferences over the possible values for different groups of annotation variables. Factors thus provide a way to reduce disparate observations to a common currency.

Once we represent individual beliefs with factors, we combine a group of factors  $\{f_j\}_{j=1}^J$  into a single probability model by multiplying their values together and normalizing:

$$P(\mathbf{A}) = \frac{1}{Z} \prod_{f_i \in \{f_j\}_{j=1}^J} f_i(\mathbf{A}_i) \quad (1)$$

The normalizing constant  $Z$  causes the scores to define a probability distribution over the values of  $\mathbf{A}$ , which directly translates into a distribution over specifications.

One way to view Equation 1 is as a specific case of Hinton’s concept of a Product of Experts [19]. From this view, each factor represents an “expert” with some specific knowledge which serves to constrain different dimensions in a high-dimensional space. The product of these experts will then constrain all of the dimensions. In this case, the dimensions represent the space of possible specifications, and the most probable specifications are those that most “satisfy” the combined set of constraints.

Note that because factors can share inputs their values are not independent; such correlation gives the model much expressive power. As stated previously (§ 2.1), annotations may be correlated (e.g., if `fopen` is an *ro*, then `fclose` is likely a *co*). We capture this correlation by having the probabilistic model represent a probability distribution  $P(\mathbf{A})$  over the values of *all* the annotation variables  $\mathbf{A}$ .

The simplicity of Equation 1 is deceptive. It is trivial to define an ad hoc scoring function that in a deep sense means nothing. This function is not one of those. It subsumes the expressive power of both Bayesian networks and Markov Random Fields, two widely used methods

for modeling complex probabilistic domains, because both can be directly mapped to it. In our experience it is also simpler and easier to reason about. We defer discussion of its mathematical foundation (see [36]) — but for our purposes, it has the charm of being understandable, general enough to express a variety of inference tricks, and powerful enough to make them mean something.

We now show how to use factors by defining two common types of factors for our example: behavioral signatures and prior beliefs.

### 3.3 Behavioral Signatures

*“Behavior is the mirror in which everyone shows their image.”*

— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

In general, the more something behaves like an X, the more probable it is an X. In our context, programmers often use program objects that should have a given annotation in idiomatic ways. Such *behavioral signatures* provide a good source of data that we can automatically extract from code (e.g., by using static analysis), which gives a nice mechanical way to get large data samples. As with any statistical analysis, the more data we have the more information we can extract.

The most common behavioral signature for any annotation is that programs generally behave correctly and that errors are rare. Thus, correct annotations (typically!) produce fewer errors than incorrect ones. We measure how much a behavioral signature is exhibited in a program by using a *behavioral test*. A behavioral test works as follows: for every location in a program where a behavioral signature *may* apply, we conduct a *check* to see if a given set of annotations matches that signature. Because the behavior may involve reasoning about the semantics of different execution paths in the program (either intra- or inter-procedurally), this check is implemented using a static analysis *checker*.

The checker we use in this paper is an intra-procedural static analysis that simulates the DFA in Figure 2 on paths through functions stemming from callsites where a pointer is returned. In principle, however, checks can employ program analysis of arbitrary complexity to implement a behavioral test, or even be done with dynamic analysis. The output of the checker indicates whether or not the annotation assignment  $\mathbf{a}_i$  to the set of annotation variables  $\mathbf{A}_i$  matched with one (or more) behavioral signatures. We can capture this belief for our example with a single *check factor*,  $f_{\langle check \rangle}(fopen:ret, fread:4, fclose:1)$ :

$$f_{\langle check \rangle}(\dots) = \begin{cases} \theta_{\langle ok \rangle} & : \text{ if DFA = OK} \\ \theta_{\langle bug \rangle} & : \text{ if DFA = Bug} \end{cases}$$

This factor weighs assignments to *fopen:ret*, *fread:4*, and *fclose:1* that induce bugs against those that do not with a ratio of  $\theta_{\langle bug \rangle}$  to  $\theta_{\langle ok \rangle}$ . For instance, suppose we believe that any random location in a program will have a

---

```

1. FILE * fp1 = fopen( "myfile.txt", "r" );
2. FILE * fp2 = fdopen( fd, "w" );
3. fread( buffer, n, 1, fp1 );
4. fwrite( buffer, n, 1, fp2 );
5. fclose( fp1 );
6. fclose( fp2 );

```

---

**Figure 3:** Code example that would produce two distinct checks, one for *fp1* and *fp2* respectively. Observe that both *fopen* and *fdopen* return ownership of a resource that must be claimed by *fclose*.

bug 10% of the time. This can be reflected in  $f_{\langle check \rangle}$  by setting  $\theta_{\langle bug \rangle} = 0.1$  and  $\theta_{\langle ok \rangle} = 0.9$ . These values need only be rough guesses to reflect that we prefer annotations that imply few bugs.

Check factors easily correlate annotation variables. In this case,  $f_{\langle check \rangle}$  correlates *fopen:ret*, *fread:4*, and *fclose:1* since its value depends on them. In general there will be one “ $f_{\langle check \rangle}$ ” for each location in the program where a distinct bug could occur. Figure 3 gives an example with two callsites where two file handles are acquired by calling *fopen* and *fdopen* respectively. These two cases constitute separate checks (represented by two factors) based on the reasoning that the programmer made a distinct decision in both cases in how the returned handles were used. Observe in this case that the variable *fclose:1* is associated with two checks, and consequently serves as input to two check factors. Thus the more a function is used the more evidence we acquire about the function’s behavior through additional checks.

### 3.4 Prior Beliefs: Small Sample Inference

As in any data analysis task, the less data we have the harder inference becomes. In our domain, while a large number of callsites are due to a few functions, a large number of functions have few callsites. As already discussed, AFGs partially counter this problem by explicitly relating different functions together, thus information from one annotation can flow and influence others. An additional approach that cleanly melds into our framework is the use of *priors* to indicate initial preferences (biases). We attach one prior factor to each annotation variable to bias its value. Having one prior factor per annotation variable, rather than per callsite, means it provides a constant amount of influence that can be gradually overwhelmed as we acquire more evidence.

For example, a completely useless specification for a codebase is that all functions have either  $\neg ro$  or  $\neg co$  annotations. This specification generates no bugs since nothing is ever allocated or released, but is vacuous because we are interested in identifying allocators and deallocators. One counter to this problem (we discuss an additional method later in § 5.1) is to encode a slight bias towards specifications with *ro*’s and *co*’s. We encode this bias with two sets of factors. The first is to bias towards

*ro* annotations with the factor  $f_{\langle ro \rangle}$ :

$$f_{\langle ro \rangle}(X) = \begin{cases} \theta_{\langle ro \rangle} & : \text{ if } X = ro \\ \theta_{\langle \neg ro \rangle} & : \text{ if } X = \neg ro \end{cases}$$

For instance,  $\theta_{\langle ro \rangle} = 0.8$  and  $\theta_{\langle \neg ro \rangle} = 0.2$  means that we prefer *ro* to  $\neg ro$  annotations with an odds of 8:2. Our example has one such factor attached to *fopen:ret*. Values of this factor for different specifications are depicted in Table 1.

The addition of  $f_{\langle ro \rangle}(\text{fopen:ret})$  biases us towards *ro* annotations, but may cause us to be overly aggressive in annotating some formal parameters as *co* in order to minimize the number of bugs flagged by the checker (thereby maximizing the value of the  $f_{\langle check \rangle}$  factors). To bias against *co* annotations, we define  $f_{\langle co \rangle}$  in an analogous manner to  $f_{\langle ro \rangle}$ . We set  $\theta_{\langle co \rangle} = 0.3$  and  $\theta_{\langle \neg co \rangle} = 0.7$ , which makes our bias away from *co* annotations slightly weaker than our bias for *ro* annotations. In our example, we add two *co* factors:  $f_{\langle co \rangle}(\text{fread:4})$  and  $f_{\langle co \rangle}(\text{fclose:1})$ . These two factors, while distinct, share the same values of  $\theta_{\langle co \rangle}$  and  $\theta_{\langle \neg co \rangle}$ .

In general, we use priors when we have some initial insights that can be overcome given enough data. Further, when we do not know enough to specify their values, they can be omitted entirely.

### 3.5 Computing Probabilities

Equipped with four factors to encode beliefs for the three functions, we now employ Equation 1 to compute final probabilities for the possible specifications.

We first multiply the values of the factors (shown in column “ $\prod f$ ” of Table 1) and then normalize those values to obtain our final probabilities. From Table 1, we can see that for the specification  $\langle ro, \neg co, co \rangle$  (first row) the product of its individual factor values is  $0.9 \times 0.8 \times 0.7 \times 0.3 = 0.151$ . After normalizing, we have a probability of 0.483, making it the most probable specification. Observe that because of our bias towards *ro* annotations, the second most probable specification,  $\langle \neg ro, \neg co, \neg co \rangle$ , has a probability of 0.282 (almost half as likely). Further, we can use the table to compute the probabilities of individual annotations. To compute  $P(\text{fopen:ret} = ro)$ , we sum the probabilities in the last column for each row where *fopen:ret* = *ro*.

These probabilities match our intuitive reasoning. The probability  $P(\text{fopen:ret} = ro) \approx 0.7$  indicates that we are confident, but not completely certain, that *fopen* could be an *ro*, while  $P(\text{fread:4} = \neg co) \approx 0.9$  shows that we have a strong belief that *fread* is  $\neg co$ . For *fclose*, we are left with a modest probability that  $P(\text{fclose:1} = co) \approx 0.52$ . While this number seems low, it incorporates both our bias towards *ro* annotations and our bias against *co* annotations. Observe that if we rank the possible *co*’s by their probabilities (in this case only two), *fclose* is at

the top. The more locations where *fclose* is used in a similar manner the more confidently we believe it is a *co*.

### 3.6 How to Handle Magic Numbers?


By now, the reader may feel uneasy. Despite dressing them in formalisms, factors simply map annotation values to magic numbers. (Or, in formal newspeak, the *parameters* of the model.) As with all uses of magic numbers two questions immediately surface: (1) where do they come from? and (2) how hard are they to get right?

For our experiments, even crudely-chosen parameter values (as we have done so far) work well. This robustness seems to be due to two features: (1) the large amount of data that inference can work with and (2) the strong behavioral patterns evident in code. Further, these numbers seem portable across codebases. In a separate paper [20], when we took the parameters learned on one codebase A and used them for inference on another codebase B the results were imperceptible compared to learning them directly on B from a perfect set of known annotations. (We discuss the mechanics of learning in § 6.3.)

However, assume a hypothetical case where neither approach works. Fortunately, the way annotations get consumed provides algorithmic ways to converge to good parameter values. First, we commonly run inference repeatedly over a codebase as it evolves over time — thus, there will be significant numbers of known annotations from previous runs. Because our approach easily incorporates known information (in this case previously validated annotations), users can (1) apply machine learning to refine parameter values, (2) recompute annotation probabilities, or (3) do both simultaneously. In all cases results will improve.

The same approach works even when applying inference to a codebase for the first time. Annotations either get consumed directly or get fed to an error checking tool. In both cases we can sort the annotations or errors (based on the probabilities of their underlying annotations) from most-to-least probable, and inspect them by going down the list until the number of inference mistakes becomes annoying. We then rerun inference using the validated annotations as discussed above.

Second, it is generally clear how to conservatively bias parameters towards higher precision at the expense of lower recall. For example, assume we feed inferred annotations to a checker that flags storage leaks (*ro* without a subsequent *co*). We can strongly bias against the *ro* annotation to the extent that only a function with a very low error rate can get classified as an *ro*. While this misses errors initially, it ensures that the first round of inspections has high quality errors. Rerunning learning or inference will then yield a good second round, etc.



**Figure 4:** Factor graph for the code example in Figure 3. Rectangular nodes represent factors and round node represent annotation variables. The top factors represent factors for prior beliefs (§ 3.4), while the bottom factors represent behavioral tests (checks) (§ 5.1).

## 4 Annotation Factor Graphs

While Equation 1 is the formal backbone of our framework, in practice we operate at a higher level with its corresponding visual representation called a *factor graph*. A factor graph is an undirected, bipartite graph where one set of nodes represent the variables  $\mathbf{A}$  and the other set of nodes represent the factors  $\{f_j\}_{j=1}^J$ .

We call the factor graphs we construct for annotation inference *Annotation Factor Graphs* (AFGs). Figure 4 depicts an AFG for the code example in Figure 3. Depicted are nodes for annotation variables, factors for prior beliefs (§ 3.4), and factors that represent two distinct checks of the code fragment. Each factor node (square) maps to a distinct factor multiplicand in Equation 1, each variable node (oval) maps to an annotation variable, and an edge exists between a factor node and variable node if the variable is an input to the given factor. Further, beliefs about one variable can influence another if there is a path between them in the graph. For example, observe that the AFG in Figure 4 explicitly illustrates the indirect correlation between `fopen` and `fdopen` through their relationship to `fclose`. If we believe that `fopen` is an `ro`, this belief propagates to the belief that `fclose` is a `co` because of the check for `fp1`. This belief then propagates to the belief that `fdopen` is an `ro` because of the check for `fp2`. While the AFG illustrates this flow of correlation, the underlying machinery is still Equation 1. Thus AFGs meet our criteria for an inference framework capable of combining, propagating, and reasoning about imperfect information.

A benefit of factor graphs is that they more compactly represent  $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A})$  than the table in Section 3, which scales exponentially in the number of possible annotations. The inference algorithm we use to infer probabilities for annotations (§ 6.2) operates directly on the AFG, forgoing the need to build a table and exploiting the graphical structure to determine which features influence others.

## 5 Advanced Inference Techniques

Building on our concept of AFGs, this section goes beyond the basic inference techniques of Section 3 to more advanced themes. We keep our discussion concrete by exploring how to build factors for the ownership problem that incorporate multiple, differently-weighted be-

havioral tests (§ 5.1), exploit ad hoc naming conventions (§ 5.2), and handle a function that may have no good labeling for a specification because it grossly violates the ownership idiom (§ 5.3). Our experiments (§ 7) evaluate an AFG with all of these features. While we discuss these points in terms of the ownership problem, they readily apply to other inference tasks.

### 5.1 Multiple Behavioral Tests

The properties we wish to infer almost always have multiple behavioral signatures. For signatures that are mutually exclusive (i.e., only one behavior can be exhibited at once) we can define a single check factor that weighs the different observed behaviors. For non-exclusive behaviors, we can simply define different factors as we have done so far. We thus focus on the former. We illustrate the technique by refining the checker in Figure 2 from a checker which reduced all behaviors to two mutually exclusive states ( $\{Bug, OK\}$ ) to one which captures more nuanced behavior with five final states, given in Figure 5. The five signatures it accepts are:

1. *Deallocator*: a `ro`’s returned pointer reaches a single matching `co` that occurs at the end of the trace.
2. *Ownership*: a `ro`’s returned pointer reaches a single matching `co` that does not occur at the end of the trace (i.e., is followed by one or more  $\neg co$  functions).
3. *Contra-Ownership*: a  $\neg ro$ ’s returned pointer only reaches  $\neg co$ ’s.
4. *Leak*: an error where a `ro`’s returned pointer does not reach a `co`.
5. *Invalid use*: an error, includes all misuses besides *Leak*.

We assign weights to these outcomes as follows. First, we bias away from the promiscuous assignment of  $\neg ro$   $\neg co$  (accepted by *Contra-Ownership*) and towards `ro-co` (accepted by *Deallocator*) by giving *Deallocator* twice the weight of *Contra-Ownership*. Since *Deallocator* is the harshest test, we use it as a baseline, giving it the weight 1.0 and, thus, *Contra-Ownership* the weight 0.5. The other non-error case, *Ownership*, is the least intuitive (and we arrived at it after some experimentation): we weigh it slightly less than *Contra-Ownership* since otherwise the AFG over-biases towards `ro-co` annotations.


As before, we weight error states less than non-error states because of the assumption that programs generally behave correctly (§ 2.1). Thus, for errors we assign a low score: 0.1 for leaks and 0.01 for all other bugs (the latter occurring very rarely in practice). (Note that even if a codebase had *no* errors we would still assign these outcomes non-zero values since static analysis imprecision can cause the checker to falsely flag “errors.”)

Although all of these weights were specified with simple heuristics, we show in Section 7 that they provide respectable results. Moreover, such weights are amenable



EXTENDED-DFA STATE	$f_{\langle check \rangle}$	REASON FOR WEIGHT
<i>Deallocator</i>	1.0	Baseline
<i>Contra-Ownership</i>	0.5	Weight half as much as <i>Deallocator</i>
<i>Ownership</i>	0.3	Slightly less than <i>Contra-Ownership</i>
<i>Leak</i>	0.1	Low weight: errors are rare
<i>Invalid Use</i>	0.01	Such errors are very rare

**Table 2:** Values of  $f_{\langle check \rangle}$  for the behavioral signatures for the ownership idiom. Observe that for this factor the values do not sum to 1, but instead are based reasoning about relative “reward.”



**Figure 5:** Complete DFA used by a static checker to implement behavioral tests for Ownership. Shaded nodes are error states.

to automatic tuning (§ 6.3).

## 5.2 Ad Hoc Knowledge: Naming Conventions

Ad hoc knowledge captures information such as biases for certain annotations, naming conventions, and other heuristics. We further illustrate how to express such features by using factors to model naming conventions.

Given a list of keywords suggestive of an *ro* annotation (e.g., “alloc”, “open”), we construct a factor  $f_{\langle keyword, ro \rangle}$  for each function whose name contains the keyword as a substring:

$$f_{\langle keyword, ro \rangle}(A) = \begin{cases} \theta_{\langle keyword, ro \rangle} & : A = ro \\ \theta_{\langle keyword, \neg ro \rangle} & : A = \neg ro \end{cases}$$

This factor is attached to a function’s *ro*/ $\neg ro$  annotation variable and rewards or penalizes *ro* annotations depending on the ratio of the factor’s values. This factor (and its parameters) is replicated for all functions whose name contains the given keyword.

For *co* variables, the construction is similar, except that instead of the factor being associated with one *ro* annotation variable, it is associated with all the *co* annotation variables for a function. If *any* of those variables have the value *co*, then the factor maps to  $\theta_{\langle keyword, co \rangle}$  and to  $\theta_{\langle keyword, \neg co \rangle}$  otherwise. Our reasoning is that naming conventions imply that at least one of the parameters should have a *co* annotation.

We only construct such factors if the function contains the keyword; in our experience while the presence of a keyword may suggest a function’s role, the absence of a keyword usually provides no additional information.

## 5.3 Does the Model Fit?

The ownership idiom only approximates how developers use resources. Thus, there will be functions that do not fit

it (e.g., byzantine uses of reference counting). If a function is far enough outside the ownership model, then no matter what annotation(s) we assign it, *ro* or  $\neg ro$ , *co* or  $\neg co$ , the checker will flag a proliferation of “errors.” This problem arises in many inference contexts: the property we want to infer assumes some structure of how code behaves, and when those assumptions are wrong, the resultant noise can hurt inference dramatically. AFGs let us tackle this problem by simply modeling the possibility that a function may not fit the ownership. We discuss two ways to do so.

The first way just adds another annotation  $\neg fit$  to the domain of our annotation variables and models “not fitting” as yet another behavioral signature (as in § 5.1). We modify the checker described in Section 5.1 so that if it encounters a  $\neg fit$  annotation while checking it transitions to a special end-state *Outside Model*. For the ownership idiom, this increases the number of end-states in the checker DFA from five to six. We then change  $f_{\langle check \rangle}$  to assign *Outside Model* a value slightly above those for errors but below that of acceptable states (e.g., 0.2). Thus, if all values for an annotation variable cause many errors, we will overcome our bias against the  $\neg fit$  value and classify the variable as not fitting the model. Once an annotation variable is classified as  $\neg fit$ , all behavioral tests involving that function are effectively discarded since the outcomes of those checks will always be *Outside Model*. Thus, *Outside Model* represents a state where the checker accepts *any* behavior, regardless of the annotation values.

The second way treats the not-fit property more globally: if the annotation variables for a function’s return value or *any* of its formal parameters cause it to not fit, we remove the entire function from our checks. Implementing this requires correlating annotation variables in the AFG in a new way by adding a “meta-annotation” for each function whose corresponding annotation variable has the domain  $\{fit, \neg fit\}$ . For example, for the function `fopen` we would create the variable `fopen:fit`. Similarly as above, we modify the checker to include an *Outside Model* state, but because the not-fit property is now shared by all of the function’s annotation variables, the checker consults the fit-variable for a function immediately prior to consulting the values of any of the function’s regular annotation variables. As before, when the value is  $\neg fit$  the checker transitions to *Outside Model*; otherwise execution continues as normal by consulting the regular annotation variable and taking the usual transition in the DFA. Consequently, a function’s fit-variable serves as an additional input to each check factor that involves at least one of the function’s regular annotation variables. As before, we state a strong bias toward a value of *fit* by attaching a prior belief factor to the fit-variable. Thus, if all values for any of a function’s an-



notation variables lead to many errors, we overcome our bias against the  $\neg fit$  value and classify the function as not fitting the model.

As described in Section 7.3, this second construction found aspects of Linux that proved noisome for inference. Moreover, neither approach is specific to the ownership idiom and can be applied to other annotation inference domains.

## 6 Implementation

We now discuss our implementation, including the details of the actual checker and how probabilities are computed in practice from the AFG.

### 6.1 The Checker

Our program analysis is built on CIL [27] and is similar to `xgcc` [15]: unsound, but efficient and reasonably effective. The analysis engine, written in OCaml, is partially derived from the version of `xgcc` as described in Chou’s thesis [6]. Our entire factor graph implementation is written in OCaml as well.

For the ownership checker, beyond constructing checks for every callsite that returns a pointer, we track the use of string constants within the function and treat them as if they were returned by a  $\neg ro$ . Pointer dereferences are modeled as implicit calls to a  $\neg co$  function to monitor if an owning pointer is used in any way after it is claimed. We also perform minor alias tracking: when tracking a pointer  $p$  and we observe the expression  $q = p$  (where  $q$  is a local variable) we add  $q$  to  $p$ ’s alias set. We do not model ownership transfer from  $p$  to  $q$  (unlike [18]) and simply treat  $q$  as another name for  $p$  since both pointers are local variables (i.e., the reference has not escaped the function). Further, when a tracked pointer is involved in a `return` statement, we consult the corresponding  $ro$  ( $\neg ro$ ) annotation of the enclosing function and treat it essentially as a  $co$  ( $\neg co$ ) annotation except that for error conditions we always transition to the *Invalid Use* state. This follows from the intuition that while programmers may accidentally leak resources on unforeseen paths, when implementing a function they reason very consciously about the properties of the function’s return value. Hence ownership errors at `return` sites are considered very rare. This allows the AFG to model a form of inter-procedural reasoning that handles idioms such as wrapper functions.

Because the checker analyzes multiple paths stemming from a single pointer returning callsite, we summarize the results over all analyzed paths by reporting the most pessimistic DFA state found: *Invalid Use*, followed by *Leak*, *Ownership*, *Contra-Ownership*, and finally *Deallocator*. The idea is to penalize annotations that induce errors, and reward annotations that completely obey our strictest behavioral signatures.

---

```

▷ A: annotation variables, known: known annotations
GIBBSAMPLE(A, known)
  a = {}
  ▷ initial random values
  for v ∈ A, v ∉ known
    a[v] = RANDOMVALUE(DOMAIN(v))
  ▷ burn in the sample
  for j = 1 to 1000
    for v ∈ PERMUTENVARIABLES(A), v ∉ known
      N = 0.0
      ▷ compute all scores that rely on v’s annotation
      for d ∈ DOMAIN(v)
        scores = {}
        a[v] = d
        scores[d] = FACTORSCORE(v, a)
        N = N + score[d]
      ▷ normalize scores
      for d ∈ DOMAIN(v)
        scores[d] = scores[d]/N
      a[v] = DISTRIBUTIONSAMPLE(scores)
  return a

```

---

**Figure 6:** Pseudocode for Gibbs sampling from  $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A})$ .

Finally, there are paths the checker does not analyze because they are beyond its limited reasoning capability. We abort the analysis of paths where a tracked pointer is stored either into a global or the field of a structure. If all the paths for a given check would be discarded (this is determined when the AFG is constructed) the check is not included in the AFG. While this leads to some selection bias in the paths we observe, our decision was to focus on paths that would provide the cleanest evidence of different behavioral signatures. Accurately modeling the heap shape of systems programs statically is an important open problem that we (fortunately) did not need to solve in order to infer properties of many functions.

### 6.2 Probabilistic Inference

In theory it is possible to compute probabilities for annotations by directly using Equation 1, but this requires enumerating an exponential number of combinations for the values of annotation variables. Instead, we estimate probabilities using *Gibbs sampling* [13], which generates approximate samples from the distribution  $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A})$ . Abstractly this algorithm simulates a random walk through a Markov chain. Theory shows that once the chain is run long enough it converges to its stationary distribution (equilibrium), and sampling from that distribution is equivalent to drawing samples from  $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A})$ .

While the full details of Gibbs sampling are beyond the scope of this paper, the pseudocode for generating samples is depicted in Figure 6. Gibbs sampling has two key advantages over other algorithms: (1) it treats the checker implementation as a black box and (2) at all times there is a complete assignment of values (in  $a$ ) to all the variables in the AFG. The upshot is that we always run the checker with a full set of annotations.

To generate a single sample, we perform “burn-in,” a

process of iteratively adjusting the values of the variables to drift them towards a configuration consistent with being drawn from  $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A})$ . Determining the *minimum* number of iterations for the burn-in is generally perceived as a black art; we have chosen a large number (1000) that has yielded consistently reliable results.

Each iteration of the burn-in visits each variable  $v$  in the AFG in random order. To generate a new value for  $v$ , for each of its possible values we call FACTORSCORE to compute the product of all the factors in the AFG that share an edge with  $v$ . This computation will re-run the checker for *every* check in which  $v$  appears. The result is a single non-negative score for each value  $d$  of  $v$ . The scores are then normalized to create a probability distribution over  $v$ 's values, and finally a new value for  $v$  is sampled from this distribution.

After the burn-in completes, we take a snapshot of the values of *all* variables and store it as a single sample from  $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A})$ . From these samples we estimate probabilities for annotations. For example, to estimate the probability that an annotation has the value  $ro$ , we simply count the fraction of samples where it had the value  $ro$ .

This naïve description is subject to numerous well-known improvements. First, all computations are done in log-space to avoid problems with arithmetic roundoff. Second, we apply standard “annealing” tricks to improve convergence of the simulated Markov chain.

Our most important optimization (which we devised specifically for AFG inference), involves the execution of the checker. Because the checker will be executed *many* times, we cache checker results for each check by recording what values in  $a$  the checker consulted and storing the outcome of the check in a trie. This memoization is agnostic to the details of the checker itself, and leads to a two orders of magnitude speedup. The caches tend to be fairly well populated after generating 3-5 samples for the AFG, and is the primary reason the algorithm scales to analyzing real codebases.

### 6.3 Learning Parameters

If some annotations are known for a codebase, the parameters of an AFG can be learned (or tuned) by applying machine learning. The general approach to learning parameters for factor graphs is to apply gradient ascent to maximizing the likelihood function, where in this case the data is the set of known annotations. At a high level, gradient ascent iteratively tunes the parameters of the AFG to maximize the probability that the known annotations would be predicted using Equation 1. Full derivation of the gradient and the specific details for getting gradient ascent to work for AFGs is beyond the scope of this paper, but complete details can be found in [20]. Section 7.4 discusses our experience with parameter learning for leveraging codebase naming conventions.

		AFG Size		Manually Classified Annotations							
Codebase	Lines ( $10^3$ )	$ \mathbf{A} $	# Checks	$ro$	$\neg ro$	$\frac{ro}{\neg ro}$	$co$	$\neg co$	$\frac{co}{\neg co}$	Total	
SDL	51.5	843	<b>577</b>	35	25	1.4	16	31	0.51	<b>107</b>	
OpenSSH	80.12	717	<b>3416</b>	45	28	1.6	10	108	0.09	<b>191</b>	
GIMP	568.3	4287	<b>21478</b>	62	24	2.58	7	109	0.06	<b>202</b>	
XNU	1381.1	1936	<b>9169</b>	35	49	0.71	17	99	0.17	<b>200</b>	
Linux	6580.3	10736	<b>92781</b>	21	31	0.67	19	93	0.20	<b>164</b>	

**Table 3:** Quantitative breakdown for each codebase of: (1) the size of the codebase, (2) the size of constructed AFG, and (3) the composition of the test set used for evaluating annotation accuracy. For the AFG statistics,  $|\mathbf{A}|$  denotes the number of annotation variables.

## 7 Evaluation

We applied our technique to five open source codebases: SDL, OpenSSH, GIMP, XNU, and the Linux kernel. Table 3 gives the size of each codebase and its corresponding AFG. For each codebase’s AFG we generated 100 samples using Gibbs sampling to estimate probabilities for annotations. We sort annotations from most-to-least probable based on these annotation probabilities. Note, we provided no “seed” annotations to the inference engine (e.g., *did not* include `malloc`, `free`). Since  $ro$  and  $co$  represent two distinct populations of annotations, we evaluate their accuracy separately. For our largest AFG (Linux), Gibbs sampling took approximately 13 hours on a 3 GHz dual-core Intel Xeon Mac Pro, while for the smallest AFG (SDL) sampling finished in under 5 minutes. Unless otherwise noted, the AFGs we evaluate include the factors for modeling prior biases (§ 3.4) and for multiple behavioral tests (§ 5.1).

Table 3 gives the breakdown of the “test set” of annotations we manually classified for each codebase. We selected the test set by: (1) automatically extracting a list of all functions involved in a check, (2) randomly picking  $n$  functions ( $100 \leq n \leq 200$ ) from this list, and (3) hand classifying these  $n$  functions. Note that this method produces a very harsh test set for inference because it picks functions with few callsites as readily as those with many. A seemingly innocent change produces a drastically easier test set: pick  $n$  functions from a list of all callsites. The selected test set would inflate our inference abilities since the probability of picking a function scales with the number of callsites it has. As a result, most functions in the test set would have many callsites, making inference much easier. In aggregate, we manually classified around 1,000 functions, giving a very comprehensive comparison set.

We first measure the accuracy of inferred annotations (§ 7.2). We then discuss the model’s resilience to unanticipated coding idioms (§ 7.3). We next discuss our experience extending the core AFG model with keyword factors (§ 7.4). Finally we discuss using inferred annotations as safety nets for bug-finding tools (§ 7.5) and for finding bugs (§ 7.6).

## 7.1 Codebases

We evaluated our technique on important, real-world applications and systems based on both their size and their disparate implementations. We strove for project diversity in coding idioms and resource management.

The smallest project, SDL, is a challenge for inference because most functions have few callsites (most are called fewer than four times). Further, because it was originally developed for porting games from Windows to Linux, it employs uncommonly-used resource management functions from external libraries such as XLib. Thus, inferring these functions is not only challenging but also useful. As our results show, the AFG model readily infers correct *ro* and *co* annotations for functions in SDL that have as few as one or two callsites.

OpenSSH and the GIMP are widely-employed applications with modest to large source code size. The GIMP image manipulation program uses custom memory management functions and a plug-in infrastructure where plug-ins are loaded and unloaded on demand and where leaking plug-in memory is not considered an error because of their short lifetime. Despite such noise, our AFG worked well, and discovered several memory leaks in the GIMP core.

XNU (the kernel for Mac OS X) contains many specialized routines for managing kernel resources. Our results are mostly for the core kernel because much of the rest of XNU is written in C++, which our front-end does not handle. Inferred annotations for XNU immediately led to the discovery of bugs.

The Linux 2.6.10 kernel is a strong test because it is huge and its code frequently breaks the *ro-co* idiom due to sporadic use of (among other things) reference-counting and weird pointer mangling. Despite these challenges, our AFG successfully analyzed Linux with a reasonable annotation accuracy.

Note that AFG size scales with the number of checks, which only roughly correlates with code size: we ignore functions not involved in at least one check and (by necessity) skip function implementations our C front-end had difficulty parsing.

## 7.2 Annotation Accuracy

This section measures the accuracy of our inferred specifications. Our first experiment, shown in Table 4, gives a feel for the initial accuracy of inferred annotations. It presents the results from the first 10 and 20 inspections of the highest probability annotations for each codebase. These are selected from *all* the annotation variables in the AFG. The table assumes that the *ro* and *co* annotations are inspected separately, although this need not be the case in practice. The first few inspections are important as they represent our most confident annotations and will be the basis of a user’s initial impression of the

Codebase	Inspections	Inspections by $P(ro)$		Inspections by $P(co)$	
		$ro$ ’s	$\neg ro$ ’s	$co$ ’s	$\neg co$ ’s
SDL	10	<b>10</b>	0	<b>9</b>	1
	20	<b>20</b>	0	<b>17</b>	3
OpenSSH	10	<b>10</b>	0	<b>10</b>	0
	20	<b>19</b>	1	<b>16</b>	4
GIMP	10	<b>10</b>	0	<b>9</b>	1
	20	<b>20</b>	0	<b>16</b>	4
XNU	10	<b>9</b>	1	<b>9</b>	1
	20	<b>16</b>	4	<b>17</b>	3
Linux	10	<b>8</b>	2	<b>9</b>	1
	20	<b>17</b>	3	<b>18</b>	2

**Table 4:** Absolute number of *ro* (*co*) annotations found within the first 10 and 20 inspections for each codebase.


results. These top ranked annotations have near perfect accuracy for *ro*’s and *co*’s on all codebases.

We then more thoroughly measure annotation accuracy by comparing inferred annotations to the entire test set for each codebase (from Table 3). We also compare the accuracy of our base AFG against two ablated (i.e., broken) ones: AFG-NOFPP, which measures the effect of decreasing checker power, and AFG-RENAME, which measures the effect of decreased correlation.

Figure 7 shows the annotation accuracy of all three models for each codebase test set using *Receiver Operating Characteristics* (ROC) curves [11]. The ROC curve for *ro* annotations plots the classification accuracy as the classification probability threshold  $t$  slides from 1 to 0. Any annotation with a probability  $P(A = ro) \geq t$  is classified as *ro*, and  $\neg ro$  otherwise. The x-axis depicts, for each value of  $t$ , the cumulative fraction of all the  $\neg ro$ ’s in the test set that were mistakenly classified as *ro* (the *false positive rate*, or *FPR*). The y-axis depicts the cumulative fraction of all the *ro*’s in the test set that were correctly classified as *ro* (the *true positive rate*, or *TPR*). Perfect annotation inference would yield a 100% TPR with a 0% FPR (visually a step, with a line segment from (0,0) to (0,1) and another from (0,1) to (1,1)), as all the *ro*’s appear before all of the  $\neg ro$ ’s when the annotations are sorted by their probabilities. Random labeling yields a diagonal line from (0,0) to (1,1). With ROC curves we can easily compare accuracy across code bases since they are invariant to test set size and the relative skew of *ro*’s to  $\neg ro$ ’s and *co*’s to  $\neg co$ ’s.

**Basic AFG:** as can be seen in the figure, the AFG model has very high accuracy for all codebases except Linux, where accuracy is noticeably lower but still quite good. SDL, had both the least code and the highest annotation accuracy, with a nearly perfect accuracy for *co*’s. Further, 35% of all *ro*’s for SDL are found without inspecting a single  $\neg ro$ . For OpenSSH we observe around a 90% TPR with a FPR of 10% or less. Both GIMP and XNU observe an 80% or better TPR for both *ro*’s and *co*’s with a 20% FPR.

Accuracy appears to decrease with increased codebase size. While inspecting results, we observed that larger



**Figure 7:** ROC curves depicting accuracy of inferred annotations. Results are averaged over 10 runs where we add Gaussian noise to AFG parameters. Error bars (shown at the classification probability thresholds of 0.95, 0.7, and 0.4) depict standard deviations.

Codebase	# Callsites per Function		% of Functions with . . .	
	Mean	Median	$\geq 5$ Callsites	$\geq 10$ Callsites
SDL	4.51	2	22.4	9.3
OpenSSH	7.41	2	23.0	11.5
GIMP	13.11	2	32.6	21.2
XNU	9.19	2	24.0	11.5
Linux	4.22	2	20.7	9.7

**Table 5:** Summary statistics of the number of callsites per function (only for callsites that are consulted by at least one check). Since the mean number of callsites per function is much higher than the median, the number of callsites has a long-tailed distribution.

codebases frequently violate the *ro-co* idiom and have a lot of code beyond the reasoning power of our checker. However, even the hardest codebase, Linux, had decent accuracy: we were able to infer 70% (62%) of *ro* (*co*) functions with a 30% FPR.

While Figure 7 depicts overall codebase accuracy (with an aggregate annotation accuracy of 80-90% on the first four codebases, assuming a classification probability threshold of 0.5), in truth these numbers are highly pessimistic. First, as shown in Table 4, the accuracy of both *ro* and *co* annotations for the top ranked inspections (from the set of all inferred annotations) is near-perfect across all codebases. Thus, users will almost always see valid annotations when inspecting the highest confidence results. More importantly, we observe on all codebases that the distribution of the number of callsites per function is highly skewed (Table 5), with a little over 50% of all functions being called at most twice, and only 20-30% being called five times or more. Assuming we classify, using a probability threshold of 0.5, the annotations for functions that are called five or more times, we observe on *all* codebases (including Linux) an 80-95% accuracy for both *ro* and *co* annotations, and an overall accuracy of 90%. While annotation accuracy for single callsite functions is important, correctly inferring annotations for functions that are called at least a few times often has much higher practical impact because those annotations will be used throughout a codebase (and often provide the greatest traction for bug-finding tools). Moreover, our annotation accuracy for *single* callsite functions is far better than random labeling. For such functions, on Linux the AFG model correctly infers around twice as many *ro* and *co* annotations as random labeling for the same number of inspected false positives.

**AFG-NoFPP:** reduces the checker’s analysis precision by disabling false path pruning [6] (FPP), which eliminates many bogus paths through the code that static analysis would otherwise believe existed. In practice FPP reduces false error messages by recognizing many control-dependent branches such as:

```

if( x == 1 ) p = malloc();
...
if( x == 1 ) free(p);

```

Disabling FPP will cause the checker to believe that there are four possible paths instead of two. Consequently, removing FPP generates significant noise in the checker’s results (the next section provides more detail). Unsurprisingly, for all codebases, AFG-NOFPP has significantly reduced accuracy for *co* annotations due to false paths. The main way false paths cause problems for *ro-co* inference is that they make it appear that some functions claim a resource when in reality they are never called in this manner. While this always has a negative impact on *co* accuracy, because of the large ratio of *ro*’s to  $\neg ro$ ’s for GIMP (Table 3) this over-inflates the evidence for *ro* annotations and leads to increased *ro* accuracy while still having poor *co* accuracy. AFG-NOFPP performs very poorly on XNU and Linux (to the degree that random labeling does better) as the use of many resources in these codebases are highly control-dependent.

**AFG-Rename:** evaluates the benefit of exploiting inter-correlation between annotations by systematically destroying it. We do so by “renaming,” for each callsite, the called function so that each callsite refers to a distinct function. This causes AFG-RENAME to have an annotation for each callsite of a function. We compute probabilities for these annotations as normal, but then compute probabilities for the original function annotations (non-renamed) by averaging the probabilities across the per-callsite annotations. The end result is that by we can see how much correlation helps inference by contrasting the performance of AFG-RENAME to AFG.

The curves for AFG-RENAME perform closest to AFG on the smallest codebases, and gradually diverges (especially for *co* accuracy) as we look at larger codebases. This is largely due to the increased amount of correlation in the larger codebases. The accuracy of AFG-RENAME diverges significantly from AFG for codebases larger than OpenSSH so that *co* performance degenerates to that produced by AFG-NOFPP. (Note that for OpenSSH and GIMP, an apparent bump in *co* accuracy of AFG-RENAME over AFG in the tail of the ROC curve is due a single *co* annotation, and is within the margin of noise induced by the test set size.)

**Sensitivity to magic numbers.** As part of this experiment we also measured our earlier claim that even rough guesses of AFG parameters generate acceptable (initial) results by doing the following sensitivity analysis. We perturb each AFG parameter by a randomly generated amount of Gaussian noise ( $\sigma^2 = 0.02$ ), which maintains the relative ordering between parameter values, but skews their values slightly and thus their relative odds. We generate 10 sets in this manner, use them to infer annotations, and then report averages and standard deviations (depicted as error bars in Figure 7) across all runs. In general, as the figure shows, the error bars for AFG are quite small, illustrating that our inference re-

sults were robust to small perturbations in parameter values. While we believe the parameters are amendable to tuning, the choice of numbers is not so brittle as to cause violent changes in results when perturbed slightly.

### 7.3 Detecting Unanticipated Coding Idioms

Initially, classifications for Linux were slightly worse than the other codebases because its ownership model is more subtle than the one we attempt to infer. Using the fit model variables discussed in Section 5.3, we quickly identified a corner case in Linux that we needed to explicitly model in our checker. A common practice in Linux is to conflate the values of pointers and to store error codes in them instead of memory addresses. Since the kernel resides in a restricted address space, error codes can be mangled into pointer values that lie outside this region. Such pointers are frequently tested as follows:

```
p = foo( ... );
if( IS_ERR_PTR(p) ) { /* error path */ }
```

On the true branch of such tests the reference to *p* appears to be lost, when in reality it was not a valid pointer. This causes serious problems because *IS\_ERR\_PTR* is far outside our simple *ro-co* model. Because it appears hundreds of times, inference computed a probability of 0.99 that this function did not fit ( $\neg fit$ ) the *ro-co* model and all checks involving *IS\_ERR\_PTR* were effectively removed as evidence. We immediately noticed the highly probable  $\neg fit$  value for *IS\_ERR\_PTR* and modified our checker to recognize the function and prune analysis of paths where its return value for a tracked pointer is *true*, allowing us to glean evidence from these checks.

### 7.4 Additional Information

Our last experiment for annotation accuracy looks at how overall annotation accuracy for XNU improves as inference is given additional information. We use (1) a set of 100 known good function annotations to serve as a training set — in practice these would be harvested as a checking tool is repeatedly run over a code base, and (2) a list of substrings a programmer feels might be relevant to the labeling of a function. We provided a relatively small set of 10 strings such as “alloc” and “get,” but there is nothing to keep a motivated user from listing all interesting strings from their problem domain. We applied parameter learning to train the parameters for the keyword factors based on a training set (as described in [20]), and tested the classification accuracy on the remaining 100. We set the classification probability threshold at 0.5 to indicate whether an annotation was *ro* or  $\neg ro$  (*co* or  $\neg co$ ) to get a measure of overall accuracy.

For XNU, the baseline aggregate accuracy (inference without knowing the training set) was 81.2%, and with the addition of knowing the annotations in the training set

	Function	Param.	Label	Sites	Prob.
X11 API	XAllocWMLimits	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.99
	XFree	1	<i>co</i>	9	0.98
	XGetVisualInfo	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.97
	XListPixmapFormats	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.97
	X11_CreateWMCursor	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.95
	XOpenDisplay	ret	<i>ro</i>	2	0.86
	XGetModifierMapping	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.86
	XCreateGC	ret	<i>ro</i>	2	0.84
	XFreeGC	2	<i>co</i>	2	0.82
	XFreeModifierMap	1	<i>co</i>	1	0.79
	XCloseDisplay	1	<i>co</i>	2	0.76
C Standard Library	dlopen	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.95
	opendir	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.87
	setmntent	ret	<i>ro</i>	1	0.74
	closedir	1	<i>co</i>	1	0.73
	endmntent	1	<i>co</i>	1	0.58

**Table 6:** A selection of correctly inferred labels for external functions inferred from analyzing SDL and not in the Coverity Prevent “root set.” “Sites” is the number of callsites for the given function utilized by the program analysis and used for inference.

accuracy of the test set increased to 84.2%. Knowledge of the training set during inference simulates already knowing some of the annotations. Equipped with the keyword information alone accuracy was 89.1%, with the addition of knowing the annotations in the training set the accuracy was 90.1%. This experiment demonstrates the power of our technique: we are able to easily incorporate additional information and have that information improve the accuracy of our results. We also benchmarked these results against an AFG that only included keyword and prior belief factors. While the top ranked *ro* and *co* annotations inferred from this model were usually correct, very quickly accuracy degrades as annotations are inspected. Overall, *ro* and *co* accuracy (the fraction of *ro*’s and *co*’s classified correctly) is 22-33% worse when using keyword information alone, while accuracy for  $\neg ro$ ’s and  $\neg co$ ’s also noticeably suffers.

## 7.5 Safety Nets for Bug-Finding Tools

We evaluate our classifications by comparing the inferred *ro* and *co* functions classifications for SDL against the allocator and deallocator functions used by Prevent [7].

Coverity Prevent is a commercial static analysis tool that contains several analyses to detect resource errors. It performs an unsound relaxation analysis through the call-graph to identify functions that transitively call “root” allocators and deallocators such as `malloc` and `free`. Prevent’s analysis is geared to find as many defects as possible with a low false error rate. The set of allocators and deallocators yielded by our inference and Prevent (respectively) perform a synergistic cross-check. Prevent will miss some allocators because they do not transitively call known allocators, and static analysis imprecision may inhibit the diagnosis of some functions that do. On the other hand, Prevent can classify some functions we miss since it analyzes more code than we do, has better alias tracking and better path-sensitivity. It

```
void gimp_enum_stock_box_set_child_padding (...) {
    GList *list;
    ...
    for( list = gtk_container_get_children(...); list;
        list = g_list_next(list) ) { ... }
}
```

**Figure 8:** [BUG] `gtk_container_get_children` returns a newly allocated list. The pointer to the head of the list is lost after the first iteration of the loop.

```
GList* gtk_container_get_children (GtkContainer *container) {
    GList *children = NULL;
    /* gtk_container_foreach performs a copy of
       the list using an iterator interface and
       a callback to perform an element copy. */
    gtk_container_foreach (container,
                           gtk_container_children_callback,
                           &children);
    /* The list “children” is reversed. The last pointer
       in the list is now the owning pointer. */
    return g_list_reverse (children);
}
```

**Figure 9:** Source code from the Gtk+ library of `gtk_container_get_children`. The function performs a complicated copy and reversal of a linked list. Inference labels the return value (correctly) as *ro* without analyzing the implementation.

found four classifications that our inference missed. We inspected each of the four and all were due to the fact that our static analysis made mistakes rather than a flaw in the inference algorithm.

Our belief that manual specifications will have holes was born out. Inference found over 40 allocator and deallocator functions that Prevent missed. Table 6 gives a representative subset. Prevent missed the bulk of these because SDL uses obscure interfaces which were not annotated and which were not part of the SDL source code (and therefore it could not analyze them). This experiment shows that even highly competent, motivated developers attempting to annotate all relevant functions in a “root set” easily miss many candidates.

Finally, our inference found an annotation misclassified by Prevent’s relaxation. The function `SDL_ConvertSurface` returns a pointer obtained by calling `SDL_CreateRGBSurface`. This function, in turn, returns a pointer from `malloc`, a well-known allocator function. Prevent misclassifies the return value of `SDL_ConvertSurface` as  $\neg ro$ , an error likely due to the complexity of these functions. Our checker also had problems understanding the implementation of these functions, but correctly inferred an *ro* annotation for its return value based on the context of how `SDL_ConvertSurface` was *used*. We reported this case to Coverity developers and they confirmed it was a misclassified annotation.

## 7.6 Defect Accuracy

Using our inference technique, we diagnosed scores of resource bugs (most of them leaks) in all five codebases, but since our focus was on annotation accuracy, we did not perform an exhaustive evaluation on all codebases of the quantity of bugs our tool found. All diagnosed bugs were discovered by ranking errors by the probabilities of the annotations involved, and for each codebase led to the discovery of bugs within minutes.

One particular bug found in GIMP highlights the inferential power of AFGs. Figure 8 shows an incorrect use of the function `gtk_container_get_children` (whose return value we correctly annotate as *ro*) in the core GIMP code and illustrates the power of being able to infer the annotation for a function based on the context in which it is used. This function returns a freshly allocated linked list, but in this code fragment a list iteration is performed and the head of the list is immediately lost. We did not analyze the source of the Gtk+ library when analyzing GIMP; this annotation was inferred solely from how the function was used.

The implementation of `gtk_container_get_children`, excerpted in Figure 9, shows how the list is created by performing a complicated element-wise copy (involving a custom memory allocator) after which the list is reversed, with the new head being the “owning” pointer of the data structure. Even if the implementation were available, understanding this function would pose a strenuous task for classic program analysis.

## 8 Related Work

Most existing work on inferring specifications from code looks for rules of the form “do not perform action *a* before action *b*” or “if action *a* is performed then also perform action *b*.” The inferred rules are captured in (probabilistic) finite-state automata (FSAs and PFSAs).

Engler et al [9] infer a variety of properties from template rules, including *a-b* pairs in systems code. Examples include inferring whether `malloc` is paired with `free`, `lock` with `unlock`, whether or not a null pointer check should always be performed on the return value of a function, etc. The intuition is that frequently occurring patterns are likely to be rules, while deviant behavior of strongly observed patterns are potential bugs. Our work can be viewed as a natural generalization of this earlier work to leverage multiple sources of information and exploit correlation.

Weimer and Necula [30] observed that API rule violations occur frequently on “error paths” such as exception handling code in Java programs. Consequently, they weight observations on these paths differently from regular code. We observe similar mistakes in systems code, although there identifying an error path is not always trivial. This poses a potential form of *indirect* correla-

tion to exploit for inferring annotations. High confidence specifications can be used to infer error paths, which in turn can be used to infer other specifications.

Li and Zhou [22] and Livshits and Zimmerman [25] look for generalized *a-b* patterns in code. Li and Zhou look for patterns across a codebase, whereas Livshits and Zimmerman look at patterns that are correlated through version control edits. While general, these approaches are based on data mining techniques that often require large amounts of data to derive patterns, meaning it is unlikely they will be able to say anything useful about infrequently called functions. It is also unclear how to extend them to incorporate domain specific knowledge.

Ammons et al [2] have a dynamic analysis to learn probabilistic finite-state automata (PFSAs) that describe the dependency relationship between a series of function calls with common values passed as arguments. Concept analysis is then used to aid the user, somewhat successfully, in the daunting task of debugging the candidate PFSAs [3]. Their method suffers from the usual code coverage hurdles inherent in a run-time analysis, making it difficult for such methods to infer properties about rarely executed code. They also assume program traces that illustrate perfect compliance of the rules being inferred (i.e., all traces are “bug-free”). This limitation is overcome by Yang et al [34], but unlike AFGs, their mechanism for handling noise and uncertainty is specific to the patterns they infer. In addition, it is unclear how to extend either method to incorporate domain specific knowledge in a flexible and natural way.

Whaley et al [31] derive interface specifications of the form “*a* must not be followed by *b*” for Java method calls. Their technique relies on static analysis of a method’s implementation to find out if calling *b* after *a* would produce a runtime error. Alur et al [1] extend their method using model checking to handle sequences of calls  $\sigma$  and to provide additional soundness. Although powerful, these techniques examine the implementation of methods rather than the context in which they are used. The results of such techniques are thus limited by the ability of the analysis to reason about the code, and may not be able to discover some of the indirectly correlated specifications our approach provides.

Hackett et al [14] partially automate the task of annotating a large codebase in order to find buffer overflows. Their method is used in an environment with significant user input (over a hundred thousand user annotations) and is specific to their problem domain. Further, it is unclear how to extend their technique to leverage additional behavioral signatures.

Ernst and his collaborators developed Daikon [10, 29], a system that infers program invariants via run-time monitoring. Daikon finds simple invariants specifying relational properties such as  $a \geq b$  and  $x \neq 0$ , although



conceivably inferring other properties is possible. Their method is not statistical, and invariants inferred require perfect compliance from the observed program.

More distantly related are techniques that tackle the inverse problem of “failure inference” for postmortem debugging. The goal is to diagnose the cause of a fail-stop error such as an assertion failure or segmentation fault. Both pure static analysis [26] and statistical debugging techniques have been employed with inspiring results [16, 23, 24]. Although specification inference and failure inference have different goals, we believe that many of the ideas presented in this paper could be readily applied in that domain.

## 9 Conclusion

This paper presented a novel specification inference framework based on factor graphs whose key strength is the ability to combine disparate forms of evidence, such as those from behavioral signatures, prior beliefs, and ad hoc knowledge, and reason about them in the common currency of factors and probabilities. We evaluated the approach for the ownership problem, and achieved high annotation accuracy across five real-world code-bases. While our checker was primitive, with inferred annotations we immediately discovered numerous bugs, including those that would be impossible to discover with state-of-the-art program analysis alone.

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